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Abstract
Cloud storage services became a viable alternative to other data storage options, however,
their operators are facing an issue of optimization versus privacy. To ensure data confiden-
tiality, clients would like to use end-to-end data encryption, however, proper encryption
renders all of the classic storage optimization techniques, such as data deduplication,
useless. On the other hand, these optimization techniques typically save space by ex-
ploitation of similarities and/or equalities in the data, which, by definition, breaks data
confidentiality.
Data deduplication is an optimization technique that offers very good space-saving
possibility for multi-user cloud storage services, though its deployment raises multiple
security and privacy concerns. To address these concerns, we analyze the (in)compatibility
of deduplication and encryption and propose a novel secure deduplication solution based
on the concept of “data popularity”. Our proposal rests on the real-life assumption
that “a secret shared too many times ceases to be a secret” i.e. that identical data
outsourced to the cloud by many users do not require as strong protection as unpopular
data that are outsourced by few users only. By introducing this distinction, our solution
allows to protect unpopular data in a stronger, deduplication preventing, way, while
providing weaker protection, allowing deduplication, to popular data. Moreover, the
proposed mechanism supports transition between the popular and unpopular states to
happen automatically, requiring only low computational overhead and no direct user
interaction.
While our solution is reasonably cost effective for some datasets, it is not very effi-
cient for others. The same holds true for other secure deduplication proposals – there
is often an advantage accompanied by a disadvantage. To demonstrate efficiency of our
solution we include an extensive performance evaluation as well as comparison of our
scheme to other state-of-the-art secure-deduplication solutions. We analyze the different
approaches and their features and comment on their applicability for deployments with
varying requirements.
Keywords: security, data protection, deduplication, convergent encryption, cloud stor-
age, popularity, threshold cryptosystem, multiple encryption
iv
Abstrakt
Cloudova´ u´lozˇiˇsteˇ se posledn´ı dobou stala vy´hodnou alternativou k jiny´m typ˚um u´lozˇiˇstˇ,
jejich provozovatele´ se vsˇak poty´kaj´ı s proble´mem jak skloubit optimalizaci a ochranu
ulozˇeny´ch dat. Pro zajiˇsteˇn´ı utajenosti svy´ch dat by klienti u´lozˇiˇsteˇ preferovali sˇifrovat
data jesˇteˇ na sve´m zarˇ´ızen´ı, nicme´neˇ takove´ sˇifrova´n´ı efektivneˇ znemozˇnˇuje provozovateli
u´lozˇiˇsteˇ vyuzˇ´ıt klasicke´ techniky pro optimalizaci ulozˇen´ı dat, jako je naprˇ´ıklad dedup-
likace. Na druhou stranu, optimalizacˇn´ı techniky urcˇene´ k u´sporneˇjˇs´ımu ulozˇen´ı dat cˇasto
vyuzˇ´ıvaj´ı pra´veˇ shodnost a podobnost dat, cˇ´ımzˇ, jizˇ z definice, porusˇuj´ı jejich utajen´ı.
Deduplikace dat je optimalizacˇn´ı technika, ktera´ nab´ız´ı velmi vy´hodny´ zp˚usob jak
sˇetrˇit u´lozˇnou kapacitu v cloudovy´ch u´lozˇiˇst´ıch vyuzˇ´ıvany´ch mnoha klienty, nicme´neˇ jej´ı
nasazen´ı vyvola´va´ mnoho ota´zek z hlediska bezpecˇnosti a ochrany dat. Soustrˇedili jsme
se na tyto ota´zky a analyzovali jsme mozˇnosti jak skloubit sˇifrova´n´ı a deduplikaci, cˇehozˇ
vy´sledkem je na´vrh nove´ho rˇesˇen´ı umozˇnˇuj´ıc´ıho bezpecˇnou deduplikaci dat zalozˇenou na
principu popularity dat. Na´sˇ na´vrh se op´ıra´ o prˇedpoklad zalozˇeny´ na rea´lne´m pozorova´n´ı,
zˇe ”tajemstv´ı sd´ılene´ prˇ´ıliˇs mnohokra´t prˇesta´va´ by´ti tajemstv´ım”, tedy, zˇe pokud mnoho
uzˇivatel˚u ukla´da´ shodna´ data, tato data pravdeˇpodobneˇ nevyzˇaduj´ı takovou ochranu, jako
data ulozˇena pouze neˇkolika ma´lo uzˇivateli. S vyuzˇit´ım tohoto deˇlen´ı dat, navrzˇene´ rˇesˇen´ı
umozˇnˇuje chra´nit ”nepopula´rn´ı data” bezpecˇneˇjˇs´ım zp˚usobem, ktery´ znemozˇnˇuje dedu-
plikaci a chra´nit ”popula´rn´ı data” o neˇco me´neˇ bezpecˇny´m zp˚usobem, ktery´ vsˇak dedu-
plikaci umozˇnˇuje. Navrzˇeny´ mechanismus nav´ıc podporuje automaticky´ prˇechod mezi
nepopula´rn´ımi a popula´rn´ımi daty bez potrˇeby uzˇivatelova zapojen´ı do tohoto procesu a
je u´sporny´ z hlediska pozˇadovane´ho vy´pocˇetn´ıho vy´konu.
Prˇestozˇe nasˇe rˇesˇen´ı poskytuje rozumnou volbu pro neˇktere´ skupiny dat, existuj´ı i
skupiny dat, pro ktere´ se nehod´ı. To same´ lze obecneˇ rˇ´ıci o jake´mkoliv v soucˇasnosti
zna´me´m na´vrhu bezpecˇne´ deduplikace - typicky pro kazˇdou vy´hodu existuje i neˇjaka´, k
n´ı vztazˇena´, nevy´hoda. Abychom demonstrovali efektivitu nasˇeho rˇesˇen´ı, udeˇlali jsme
pomeˇrneˇ rozsa´hle´ porovna´n´ı jeho vy´konnosti s vy´konnost´ı dalˇs´ıch state-of-the-art rˇesˇen´ı
pro bezpecˇnou deduplikaci. Analyzovali jsme rozd´ılne´ prˇ´ıstupy k implementaci bezpecˇne´
deduplikace a jejich vlastnosti a popsali jsme jejich vyuzˇitelnost v prostrˇed´ıch s r˚uznorody´mi
pozˇadavky.
Kl´ıcˇova´ slova: bezpecˇnost, ochrana dat, deduplikace, konvergentn´ı sˇifrova´n´ı, cloudove´
u´lozˇiˇsteˇ, popularita, kooperativn´ı kryptosyste´my, v´ıcena´sobne´ sˇifrova´n´ı
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Cloud solutions introduce a viable cost-effective alternative to standard in-house IT solu-
tions for various clients, be it private users or big companies. However, migration to the
cloud requires clients to outsource their data – instead of residing in a specific place on
a specific disk, the data may end up virtually anywhere where the cloud service provider
has his storage warehouses. This poses a big challenge for both clients and cloud providers
– clients typically do need to process their data and cloud providers need to deploy stor-
age optimization techniques to save space in their storage, thus it is not possible for the
client to encrypt the data before outsourcing them to cloud and retain the key locally.
Without the key, the cloud provider cannot decrypt the data, which effectively prevents
both data processing and storage optimization. Straightforward solutions such as sharing
the key with the cloud provider or renting security as a service (letting someone else do
the “security stuff”) means the user is giving up control over his data, which might not
be acceptable for various reasons (e.g. law regulations). Solving the cloud-data security
issue in a general manner that would suit everyone is a nearly-unsolvable problem, as
the different approaches typically introduce restrictions that are not acceptable for some
of the use-cases. Therefore, research focusing on cloud security typically does not try
to encompass the whole issue of outsourced data and, instead, tries to ensure improved
security only for a subset of use cases.
There are two major research areas focusing on cloud data security – the first focuses
on processing of encrypted data and its ultimate goal is to allow arbitrary processing of
encrypted data without their actual decryption; the second approach focuses on storage
optimization techniques for encrypted data. While both areas seem similar (both attempt
to enable some mechanism for encrypted data), they differ notably and the requirements
are contradictory. The first typically requires more storage space to offer more generic
processing whereas the second focuses primarily on saving storage space. In our research,
we initially tried to tackle both areas at once, but since a general approach proved overly
1
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conflicting, we chose to focus more on the latter approach – enabling storage space saving
and optimization techniques while retaining as high level of security as possible.
Encrypted data processing therefore falls out of scope of this thesis, though for people
interested in that area we recommend to start with the dissertation thesis of Craig Gen-
try [1] and follow with works that cite it and/or use the “homomorphic encryption” key
words.
A cloud provider can deploy various storage optimization techniques to save some
storage space. All share a common denominator – to save space, they exploit some
similarity in the data being stored. This is in direct contradiction with the user-required
data confidentiality, which requires that no information about the protected data can be
extracted. Additionally, considering encryption as the protection mechanism of choice
for data confidentiality, proper encryption generates ciphertexts with very high entropy,
reducing efficiency of any similarity- or equality-based storage optimization technique to
near-zero. To provide an example, we took a file that is likely to be heavily copied and
shared, encrypted it and then compared the files for similarities (for simplicity we used
the default Microsoft Word 2013 encryption and an on-line tool for binary comparison),
see Figure 1.1. As the results demonstrate, encryption using different keys produces
very different ciphertexts and thus plaintexts that are very similar (even equal) produce
ciphertexts with little-to-none similarity, effectively preventing deduplication.
Researching various storage-optimization techniques, we identified data deduplication
Figure 1.1: Demonstration of how encryption breaks similarities. Note that some minor
similarity remains even after encryption – this is caused by the Microsoft Word file format
that encrypts only text contents and properties, but leaves default templates and file
structure unchanged.
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as potential candidate for a secure storage-optimization scheme. Data deduplication is
an optimization technique that achieves enormous data reduction rate for some datasets
(e.g. over 99% reduction for typical backup scenarios [2]). Since multi-user cloud storage
services storing, among other data, popular songs, photos and movies seem to be a good
fit for highly-efficient deduplication, we analyze how encryption and data deduplication
can be combined to achieve both a storage-efficient and secure storage service.
Data deduplication is a process where the storage provider stores only a single copy
of a file (or its part) stored by several users. This way, if there are four owners of
an identical file, who all store the file using the same cloud-storage service, the cloud
provider can only store the file once, saving space equal to three-times the file size. To
avoid full-size file comparisons, deduplication uses indexes (sometimes also called tags or
locators). To obtain an index the file is first processed using an indexing function (typically
a collision-resistant hash function) and then the comparison is done using the indexes
instead of comparing entire files. Based on the location where the index computation
actually occurs, we differentiate between client-side and server-side deduplication. Client
side deduplication, as the name suggests, computes the index in the client application
and then sends only the index to the storage service. The storage service checks whether
it already has a file with this index stored, and if so, file upload is not necessary and
the client is just added as another owner of the already-stored file. This way, client-side
deduplication also benefits from network bandwidth savings – instead of transferring the
whole file, only the index is being transferred. Server-side deduplication requires the client
to upload the whole file, which is then processed on the provider-side.
While security was not an integral part of early deduplication designs, its need soon
became imminent with users requiring protection of their data. The first attempt to
combine encryption and deduplication to a “secure deduplication” solution came in 2002
under the term of convergent encryption [3]. Convergent encryption is a special form of
deterministic encryption, in which the encryption key is derived from the plaintext and
thus any owner of the same plaintext generates the same ciphertext. This way, if two users
encrypt the same file, they obtain the same encrypted file, which, in turn, can be dedu-
plicated when stored using the same storage service. Convergent encryption thus seems
like a perfect secure-deduplication solution – data is encrypted and, at the same time,
deduplication is possible. Unfortunately, convergent encryption was proven insecure [4].
Moreover, a follow-up work of Bellare et al. proved that a general impossibility result
holds stating that classic semantic security is not achievable for schemes implementing
plain convergent encryption [5]. Despite the general impossibility result, multiple research
teams refused to drop the secure deduplication idea, ours included.
Our core idea formed around a real-life assumption that “a secret shared many times
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ceases to be a secret”. Based on this assumption, we created the notion of “data popular-
ity” – if data (i.e. a file) is stored by a few users only, it is unpopular and should be well
protected; once data is stored by a certain threshold amount of users, it becomes popular
and the level of protection can be decreased. Arguably, if the user stores a copy of his
personal documents, his payslip or a draft of an unsubmitted scientific paper, there will
likely be not many more users (if any) storing the same file and the file remains unpopu-
lar and thus strongly protected. On the other hand, if the user stores a popular song or
video, there will likely be many more users storing it too – being already widely-shared,
such a file does not require such a strong protection and the level of protection can be
decreased. Note that this popularity-based differentiation also automatically solves the
issue how to automatically choose whether a file should or should not be deduplicated –
it is not necessary to split the files between those potentially sensitive that should not
be deduplicated and those that could, since all data are first considered unpopular (and
thus non-deduplicable) by design and change the state to popular automatically, once a
popularity condition is met.
The technical challenge is to design a solution that implements the data popularity idea
– the stronger protection required for unpopular data has to be some sort of semantically
secure encryption whereas the weaker protection must allow deduplication. We decided to
solve this challenge using two-layered encryption – the outer layer is semantically-secure
encryption and the inner layer convergent encryption. Once enough users share the same
file, the outer layer can be automatically peeled off, revealing the inner, convergent, layer.
Convergently encrypted file can then be immediately deduplicated. The trickiest part of
the process is the automatic transition of file from unpopular to popular – this requires
to be triggered by some event initiated either by the users themselves or by some trusted
third party. For simplicity, we decided to introduce a trusted third party in the initial
design, but later in the work we discuss ways how to reduce the data-related knowledge
and trust required by this third party.
Since our solution is quite complex by design, introducing a trusted third party and
two layers of encryption, in this work we include an overhead evaluation, demonstrating
its cost effectiveness (or ineffectiveness, for some cases). Also, as mentioned, there are
multiple other teams working on different secure deduplication solutions. After finalizing
and testing our solution, we have analyzed also the results of others and compared all
the different solutions using multiple factors. Interestingly, the comparison proved that
there is no clear winner – each solution has its own specific requirements, offers different
security notions and different efficiency for various datasets. We focused on identification
of the differences and offer discussion regarding suitability of the solutions for concrete
use cases based on various processing, security and dataset requirements and properties.
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The core contributions of this work can be summarized as follows:
• we present Eµ, enhanced threshold cryptosystem that leverages popularity and allows
fine-grained trade-off between security and storage efficiency and exploit it for the
construction of a secure deduplication scheme
• we analyze security of the proposed deduplication scheme and comment on its pos-
sible strengthening and its cost
• we provide analysis of scheme deduplication efficiency based on popularity properties
of real datasets
• we compare our secure deduplication scheme with other state-of-the-art schemes in
terms of security and efficiency and comment on their specific differences
The rest of this work is organized as follows: Chapter 2 describes the preliminary
knowledge, concepts and notation necessary for understanding the work; Chapter 3 sum-
marizes the history and evolution of secure date deduplication and lists related state-
of-the-art works; Chapter 4 provides an introductory overview of our scheme, including
the system and security models; Chapter 5 describes our secure deduplication scheme in
detail, listing scheme participants, properties and algorithms; Chapter 6 presents security
analysis of our scheme, including security proofs and alternative settings; Chapter 7 con-
sists of extensive performance evaluation of scheme properties and efficiency; and Chapter
8 concludes the work
Chapter 2
Preliminaries
In this chapter we describe the knowledge base that our secure deduplication solution
builds upon. Since the terms and notation often vary in the deduplication-oriented and
cryptography-oriented literature, we also define uniform terms and notation that will be
used throughout our work.
2.1 Data Deduplication
Data deduplication is a storage optimization technique aiming at, as the name suggests,
eliminating duplicities. The core idea of data deduplication is simple – if a dataset con-
tains some (part of) data in multiple copies then one can easily store only one copy of
such duplicate data and thus save storage space. Efficiency of deduplication is typically
expressed in the form of deduplication ratio (also called duplicity ratio) DR that is a ratio
of the original dataset size compared to the size after deduplication. The deduplication
process is depicted in Figure 2.1.
Figure 2.1: Illustration of the data deduplication process. Objects represent different files.
Deduplication ratio (DR) in the shown example is DR = 4 : 1.
6
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In practice, the trivial core deduplication idea gets a bit more complicated since the
implementation has to solve the issues of
1. identifying the duplicate data
2. removing the duplicate data
3. storing the information about the removed duplicate(s)
in some uniform and easy to manage way.
Identifying the duplicate data requires splitting the dataset into pieces that will be
compared for equality. Two typical approaches are file-based and chunk-based. File-
based approach simply compares the data on the file level – if some file in the dataset has
equal contents as some other file, contents are stored only once. Chunk-based approach is
more coarse-grained – each file is processed using some splitting function (typically a fixed-
offset partitioning or rolling hash) and the newly obtained chunks are then compared. The
advantage of file-based approach is simplicity in implementation and lesser computation
resource consumption, the advantage of chunk-based approach is better deduplication
ratio (since it is able to eliminate duplicates caused by minor in-file changes and common
in-file parts). Technically, each deduplication solution can work as file-based or chunk-
based, though chunk-based typically requires notably more effort, as the file-level dataset-
splitting offered by common filesystems needs to be refined by additional processing.
Another important aspect of identifying duplicate data is when and/or how often the
process is done. If we want to deduplicate an already existing dataset, we need to process
it as a whole at least once. However, if the dataset is only being formed and/or is dynam-
ically changing (as is typical for cloud storage services), it is more efficient to keep the
dataset always in a deduplicated state then to re-do the deduplication process of the whole
dataset once in a while. This approach is called on-line or real-time data deduplication –
each new piece of data that should be added to the dataset is first processed to obtain it’s
deduplication index (or indexes, if split to chunks), the index is then compared to a list
of already stored contents and if a hit is found, the data is deduplicated on-the-fly (note
that the index is sometimes also called tag or locator in deduplication-oriented literature).
There exists also a special version of on-line data deduplication that is called lazy or post-
poned where the duplicate existence is found in real-time but the actual deduplication
process is postponed until some special condition occurs. This special version is often
used in secure deduplication solutions.
Focusing on our cloud-based storage service scenario, there are two “deduplication
participants” – data producer (also called owner, source, client) and data consumer (cloud
storage service, often called just server). Based on where the processing required to find
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the duplicate data (i.e. splitting and index computation) is happening we speak about
client-side (source-based) or server-side (target-based) data deduplication. Client-side
requires more computing resources at the client but has the advantage that it is not
necessary to transfer the actual deduplicated data – only indexes are being sent to the
server if a hit is found, the file/chunk in question does not need to be transferred. Server-
side requires no computing resources at the client, as all processing is happening at the
server-side, though this requires that all data (even data that would be deduplicated)
needs to always be transferred from the client to the server.
Once the duplicate data has been identified the removal process is straightforward –
the duplicate data are either deleted from storage (if already stored) or simply not stored
(in the on-line deduplication case where identification precedes storing). However, this
causes the challenge of how to store information about the deleted/not stored duplicates.
If client A stored file F and client B wants to store the same file F and thus deduplication
occurs, the cloud storage service still has to record the information that client B is the
owner of file F as well. In practice this is often solved by decoupling the data and the
metadata information – data files (or chunks) are stored indexed by their deduplication
indexes in one copy only and metadata are stored and managed separately either in
some unique per-file per-client form or in some aggregate form, depending on the actual
storage capabilities and properties. Each data file must have a counter specifying how
many clients own it at a time. If the counter reaches zero, the file is deleted.
To sum-up, data deduplication can be either file-based or chunk-based (granularity
level) and either client-side or server-side (processing location). For secure deduplication
solutions, the granularity level is often less important and most of the solutions can work
in both versions, however, the processing location is of utmost importance as it typically
has direct influence on data security. Since it is necessary to formalize the descriptions,
we cover how to model deduplication in the next section.
2.1.1 Modeling Data Deduplication
To model deduplication in our cloud-based storage service scenario, we define the two
deduplication participants – a storage provider (S) that offers storage space with enabled
cross-user deduplication and a set of users (U) who store data content on the server.
For simplicity of notation, we assume that deduplication happens at the file level. Note
that to model chunk-level deduplication one can simply substitute chunk C instead of
file F . To identify files and detect duplicates, the scheme uses an indexing function I:
{0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}∗; we will refer to IF as the index for a given file F . As the metadata
is typically unimportant from the deduplication perspective (size should be marginal
compared to data), we simplify the storage provider’s back-end model as an associative
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array DBS mapping indexes produced by I to records of arbitrary length e.g. DBS[IF ] is
the record mapped to the index of file F . Each record contains two fields, DBS[IF ] .data
and DBS[IF ] .users. The first contains the content of file F , the second is a list of users
that have so far uploaded F . In practice, the DBS[IF ] .users list would be replaced by a
simple counter and the actual users would have their own metadata-based file abstractions
with file properties (such as date of creation/storage, size, date of modification, type etc.)
stored in a separate storage structure. Note that we only chose our simple model to easily
describe which users and how many do own the actual data contents of a file. Evolving the
simple model into a real cloud-based storage service structure scenario should nevertheless
be quite straightforward.
The storage provider and users interact using three user-invoked algorithms: Put, Get
and Delete. Depending on whether we are modeling client-side or server-side deduplica-
tion, the indexing function I is computed either by the client or by the server. In the
following algorithms we model the client-side version (server-side version can be directly
derived by substituting IF with F and adding I computation and IF propagation back
to the user in the Put algorithm):
Put(IF ,Ui, F ): user Ui sends IF to S. S checks whether DBS[IF ] exists and if so, appends
Ui to DBS[IF ] .users. Otherwise, it requests Ui to upload the content of F , which will
be assigned to DBS[IF ] .data. DBS[IF ] .users is then initialized with Ui.
Ui −→ S: IF , Ui
S: if(DBS[IF ] 6= ∅)
DBS[IF ].users← DBS[IF ].users ∪ {Ui}
else
Ui ←− S: provide file contents
Ui −→ S: F
S: DBS[IF ].data← F ; DBS[IF ].users← {Ui}
Figure 2.2: The Put(IF ,Ui, F ) algorithm.
Get(IF ,Ui): user Ui sends IF to S. The latter checks whether DBS[IF ] exists and whether
DBS[IF ] .users contains Ui. If it does, S responds with DBS[IF ] .data. Otherwise, it
answers with an error message.
Ui −→ S: IF , Ui
S: if(Ui ∈ DBS[IF ].users)
Ui ←− S: return DBS[IF ].data
else
Ui ←− S: return error
Figure 2.3: The Get(IF ,Ui) algorithm.
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Delete(IF ,Ui): user Ui sends IF to S. The latter checks whether DBS[IF ] exists and
whether DBS[IF ] .users contains Ui. If it does, S removes Ui from DBS[IF ] .users and
if the list is empty after the removal, whole record DBS[IF ] is deleted. Otherwise, it
answers with an error message.
Ui −→ S: IF , Ui
S: if(Ui ∈ DBS[IF ].users)
DBS[IF ].users← DBS[IF ].users \ {Ui}
if(DBS[IF ].users = ∅)
delete the whole DBS[IF ] record
else
Ui ←− S: return error
Figure 2.4: The Delete(IF ,Ui) algorithm.
2.2 Cryptography
To build our secure deduplication scheme we use many cryptographic schemes and prin-
ciples with multiple major and minor modifications. The core of our scheme is based
on symmetric and convergent encryption schemes that are combined in a thresholded
construct exploiting a secret sharing scheme. The secret sharing scheme principle is well
described in the literature [6], the rest of the building blocks are described in this section
(especially to unify notation and terminology).
2.2.1 Symmetric Cryptosystem
A symmetric cryptosystem E is defined as a tuple (K, E, D) of probabilistic polynomial-
time algorithms (assuming a security parameter 1λ). K stands for key derivation function
which takes security parameter 1λ as input and is used to generate a random secret key
k. E stands for encryption function which is used to encrypt a message m with key k and
generate a ciphertext c. D stands for decryption function that is used to decrypt c using
k to produce m. Note that the same key is used for message encryption and decryption
and thus both the user that encrypts and user that decrypts a message have to know the
same key k. Keeping k secret is a strong requirement for a symmetric encryption scheme
to remain secure.
The algorithms are defined as follows:
E .K(1λ)→ (k): generates random key k of bit-length 1λ
E .E(k,m)→ (c): takes as input a message m and produces its encrypted version c under
the key k.
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E .D(k, c) → (m): takes as input a ciphertext c and key k and outputs the cleartext
message m.
2.2.2 Convergent Encryption Scheme
A convergent encryption scheme Ec, also known as message-locked encryption scheme [7],
is similar to a symmetric cryptosystem – it is also defined as a tuple of three polynomial-
time algorithms (assuming a security parameter 1λ) (Ec.K, Ec.E, Ec.D). Differently to
a symmetric cryptosystem E and its key derivation function E .K generating random,
message-independent, keys, keys generated by Ec.K are a deterministic function of the
cleartext message m. As a direct consequence, multiple invocations of Ec.K and Ec.E
(on input of a given message m) produce identical keys and ciphertexts, respectively, as
output. Also note that since k is derived from m, a convergent encryption scheme cannot
pre-generate the encryption key without knowing the message m to be encrypted apriori.
We define the algorithms as follows (note that km specifies k corresponding to message
m):
Ec.K(1λ,m)→ (km): generates message-dependent key km of bit-length 1λ
Ec.E(km,m) → (c): takes as input a message m and produces its encrypted version c
under the key km.
Ec.D(km, c) → (m): takes as input a ciphertext c and key km and outputs the cleartext
message m.
2.2.3 Public-key Cryptosystem
A public-key cryptosystem Epk (often also called asymmetric cryptosystem) is very similar
to a symmetric cryptosystem, only instead of using one key k for both encryption and
decryption it uses a key pair consisting of two keys – a public key pk and a secret key sk.
Public-key cryptosystems do not require the public key to be kept secret (hence the name
public) and are often used as a core building block of a public key infrastructure (PKI) [8].
Since we do not need nor want to get lost in many different ways to exploit asymmetric
cryptosystems, we describe them in their simplest form and usage only defined by the
algorithms as follows:
Epk.K(1λ)→ (pk, sk): generates random keypair (pk, sk) of bit-length 1λ
Epk.E(pk,m) → (c): takes as input a message m and produces its encrypted version c
under the public key pk.
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Epk.D(sk, c) → (m): takes as input a ciphertext c and secret key sk and outputs the
cleartext message m.
2.2.4 Threshold Cryptosystem
Threshold cryptosystem is an evolution of a basic cryptosystem (symmetric or asymmet-
ric) that offers the ability to share the power of performing certain cryptographic opera-
tions (e.g. decrypting a message) among n authorized users, such that any t of them can
do it efficiently. Moreover, according to the security properties of threshold cryptosystems
it is computationally infeasible to perform these operations with fewer than t (authorized)
users.
Threshold ElGamal Cryptosystem A typical example of a threshold public-key cryp-
tosystem is a threshold variant of the popular ElGamal cryptosystem [9] where a threshold
number of users have to cooperate to be able to successfully decrypt a message. Same as
in the original non-threshold version, the threshold version is defined over a multiplicative
cyclic group G and its security is reduced on the discrete logarithm computation problem.
There is only one master secret of the system and each participant obtains a share of this
secret upon joining the system. Public key of the system is published openly. Every
participant can encrypt a message using the public key of the system. As no participant
knows the whole master secret key, decryption is only possible if t+ 1 participants coop-
erate. Labeling EtEG the threshold ElGamal cryptosystem, the following algorithms are
defined:
EtEG.Setup(1λ, n, t) → (pk, sk, S): generates an efficient description of a multiplicative
cyclic group G of order 1λ with generator g. Then it chooses an integer sk from
interval [1 ; 1λ − 1] and computes h = gsk. Public key pk = (G, q, g, h) is published,
secret key sk is distributed among participants in a (t+1)-out-of-n secret sharing
scheme (for example Shamirs’ scheme described in [6]). i-th participant gets share
ski of the master secret key.
EtEG.Encrypt(pk,m)→ (c): takes as input message m and produces its encrypted version
as follows: integer r is randomly chosen from interval [1 ; 1λ − 1] and c1 = gr is
computed. Next, hr is computed and used to form c2 = m ·hr. Ciphertext c is then
a tuple c = (c1 , c2).
EtEG.Decrypt(c) → (m): t+1 decryptors have to actively participate: i-th decryptor
computes a decryption share di = c
ski
1 and provides a tuple (i, di). Once t+1 tuples
from different decryptors are collected, csk1 can be computed using the Lagrange
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1 = c
sk
1 . Finally, m can be decrypted since
c2 = m · hr thus m = c2 · hr and csk1 = grsk = hr which gives m = c2 · csk1 .
Non-interactive Threshold Cryptosystem Threshold ElGamal cryptosystem is not
usable in situations where users cannot actively participate “on-line” when decryption is
required. For these situations a modification is required that allows the users to create so
called “decryption shares” that can be used during decryption without active participation
of the user. Here we provide a generalized description of such a modified threshold public-
key cryptosystem.
A non-interactive threshold public key cryptosystem Et is defined as a tuple (Setup,
Encrypt, DShare, Decrypt), consisting of four probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms (in
terms of a security parameter 1λ) with the following properties:
Et.Setup(1λ, n, t) → (pk, sk, S): generates the public key of the system pk, the corre-
sponding private key sk and a set S = {(ri, ski)}ni=1 of n pairs of key shares ski of
the private key with their indexes ri; key shares are secret, and are distributed to
authorized users; indexes do not need to be secret.
Et.Encrypt(pk,m)→ (c): takes as input a message m and produces its encrypted version
c under the public key pk.
Et.DShare(ri, ski, c) → (ri, dsi): takes as input a ciphertext c and a key share ski with its
index ri and produces a decryption share dsi.
Et.Decrypt(c, St) → (m): takes as input a ciphertext c, a set St = {(ri, dsi)} of t pairs of
decryption shares and indexes (e.g. |St| = t), and outputs the cleartext message m.
Chapter 3
Secure Data Deduplication –
Evolution, Properties and State of
the Art
In this chapter we first describe the issues related to secure data deduplication definition,
then specify the security goals of our secure deduplication solution and describe other
state of the art secure deduplication solutions with focus on how their approach differs
from our proposed solution.
3.1 Secure Data Deduplication
Whereas data deduplication is a well-known mechanism that is relatively simple to de-
scribe (see Section 2.1), secure data deduplication is an actively researched topic and there
is not even mutual agreement on what requirements a secure data deduplication scheme
should satisfy. This issue is caused mainly by the fact that there are multiple views of
“security” that notably differs in various scenarios. In this section we first demonstrate
this “inconsistency” issue via a short history overview, follow with the description of the
actual weakness of deduplication “causing all the problems” and finish with our view or
secure data deduplication requirements and targets, explaining why we chose them.
3.1.1 History of Convergent Encryption and Secure Data Dedu-
plication
Even though the idea to use deterministic keys computed from file contents to encrypt
the corresponding files is quite old (the first note that we were able to confirm is from
1996 mentioned by John Pettitt in the cypherpunks mailing list [10]), the first secure
14
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deduplication solution proposal based on convergent encryption including proper techni-
cal description and analysis was published by Douceur et al. in 2002 [3]. The aim of
convergent encryption was to combine data confidentiality with deduplication and the
implementation was straightforward – first convergently encrypt the file to be stored and
then compute the deduplication index of this file which is then used for equality matching
during deduplication. Since the index is computed over encrypted data, the knowledge of
the index should not be a problem.
For a few years, the convergent encryption-based approach seemed viable and was
adopted in actual production solutions such as Tahoe Least Authority File Storage [11]
or Dropbox [12]. However, in 2008 Drew Perttula was awarded the Hack-Tahoe-LAFS
award for finding a security issue caused by secure deduplication implemented in Tahoe-
LAFS. The issue allowed for the “Learn the Remaining Information Attack” – having a
partial file (e.g. well known document template) that is expected to be already stored in
the storage, the attacker can try to guess the unknown parts of the file and compute the
corresponding deduplication indexes of the “guessed files”; if a computed index results in
deduplication (corresponding file already stored in the storage) the guess is confirmed and
the attacker thus “learns contents of encrypted data” which should not be possible. See
Figure 3.1 for a spot-on weakness-documenting code snippet that Pertulla got printed on
a t-shirt as a reward.
In 2010, Harnik et al. published a paper [4] with a bit more thorough security analysis
of convergent encryption, pointing out several severe exploitations resulting in the possi-
bility to guess file contents (same as demonstrated by Perttula), use storage service as a
covert communication channel or exploit storage service as a content distribution network
(without consent or cooperation of the storage provider). Publication of these findings
led to forming of a new research area – secure data deduplication.
Figure 3.1: Code implementing a simple form of “Learn the Remaining Information At-
tack”. c© Allmydata & Drew Perttula.
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Different teams chose different strategies – some were trying to find “simple modifi-
cations” of deduplication solutions using convergent encryption to thwart (some of) the
attacks described by Harnik et al. [4], some focused on one or more of the concrete at-
tacks and developed independent solutions to thwart them without modifying the actual
convergent-encryption based secure deduplication solution itself. To stay compact, we
don’t describe the individual works here but in a follow-up Section 3.2.
The facts that most of the teams published their results labeled as “secure deduplica-
tion” schemes and solutions independently of whether they were addressing one/some/all
of the attacks described by Harnik et al., improving convergent encryption or coming with
an altogether novel secure deduplication solution, and that many of the “secure dedupli-
cation reviews” address all of the works together independently on their actual targets
confused the field a bit. To clarify our understanding of the “secure data deduplication”
term we first describe the principal weakness exploited by the attacks and then define a
few categories.
3.1.2 The “Weak Point” of Deduplication
For deduplication to work there has to be a mechanism that compares the data to find out
whether or not the same data was already stored before and thus can be deduplicated.
In our model of deduplication, the indexing function I is such a mechanism (see Sec-
tion 2.1.1). From a security standpoint, this mechanism must be perceived as information
leakage and forms the core weak point of simple deduplication, causing it to be generally
insecure.
Independently of whether deduplication (deduplication index computation) is done
by the client-side or by the server-side, the same principal “weakness” in secure dedu-
plication solution based solely on convergent encryption lies in the deterministic nature
of the index and of the encryption key, respectively. If the encryption keys were chosen
randomly (independently of the file contents), both the ciphertexts and the deduplica-
tion indexes for the same file encrypted twice would differ and deduplication would not
work. Convergent encryption “fixes” this by enforcing the encryption key (and thus also
the deduplication index) to be always the same for files with the same contents – key is
deterministically computed from file contents, encryption itself is deterministic and index
is, also deterministically, computed from the ciphertext. This creates a seemingly impos-
sible situation – a deduplication index deterministically dependent on the file contents
and known/shared with the storage provider must exist for deduplication to work yet the
dependency of the index on the file contents creates possibility of contents leakage and
thus must be eliminated.
Harnik et al. [4] focused in their analysis on the client-side (source-based) deduplica-
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tion only to stress the severity of the attacks (any user or even just a traffic observer can
mount the attack). Another valid argument was that source-based deduplication saves
not only storage space but also bandwidth, which is getting more and more important
with the proliferation of mobile devices and mobile Internet connection. We agree with
the arguments presented, though we stress that exactly the same attacks can be mounted
by the storage provider himself in case of server-side (target-based) deduplication. Tech-
nically, all the attacks can be prevented for a “normal” attacker (i.e. not the storage
provider) by using target-based instead of source-based deduplication. However, there
would still be the inquisitive doubts – can we trust the storage provider? And even if so,
should we do it?
3.1.3 Our Secure Data Deduplication Targets
When forming our view of secure data deduplication, we started with the evaluation of
“typical user needs”. Users own a lot of data that they want to store in a cloud storage
for various reasons (e.g. backup copies, ease of accessing data from multiple machines/in
multiple places). Some of the data is of personal nature and the users do not want anyone
to be able to access this data apart from them (e.g. family photos, payslips), some of the
data may be top secret (e.g. medical documentation, work files), some might be of no big
concern (e.g. application binaries, music hits). Users can be motivated to use a storage
service that uses data deduplication, even accepting to do some extra computations on
their side if it saves them time and/or money (e.g. lower prices for deduplicated data,
bandwidth savings by not uploading deduplicated data) but they require confidentiality
for their personal and secret data. Users do not blindly trust the storage provider that he
will not browse/share their data and want to have some provable mechanism for protecting
data confidentiality even from the storage provider himself. Additionally, users should not
be forced to manually classify files as confidential or non-confidential as that could be a
very tedious task, especially in backup scenarios.
Getting back to the weak point of deduplication – for deduplication to work, data must
be compared for equality but such a comparison always leaks information about the data.
Encrypting the data convergently does not help, encrypting the data non-deterministically
breaks deduplication. Simply put, data that require perfect confidentiality (in the sense of
semantic security [13]) should never be deduplicated, since deduplication inherently breaks
perfect confidentiality (a comparison mechanism i.e. a leakage has to exist). This impos-
sibility result seems obvious and was even formally described by Bellare et al. [7]. Apart
from the impossibility result, Bellare et al. described and formalized security notions
that are actually achievable with convergent encryption-like solutions. Unfortunately,
viewed from our typical user perspective, these notions are simply not strong-enough for
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confidential data – non-predictability is quite a hard assumption to accept generally.
Considering user requirements together with the impossibility result, we reached a
conclusion that a secure deduplication solution would need to make sure that confidential
data is never deduplicated and is protected by a semantically secure encryption (to prevent
any information leakage; apart from data size/length – we discuss this limitation in detail
later in the work). For the solution to actually also be “deduplication” and not just
“secure”, we also need a way to distinguish between confidential and non-confidential
data and make sure the non-confidential data gets deduplicated (if possible). Since we
specified in the user requirements that the user should not be forced to classify his/her
data manually, our target is to design a solution that would automatically distinguish
between confidential and non-confidential data and protect the confidential data on the
“semantic security level”, while protecting the non-confidential data on the “convergent
encryption level” that allows deduplication (more formal security definitions are available
in Section 6).
To achieve our target we construct a multi-layered encryption scheme exploiting the
popularity principle to distinguish between popular (“widely-known”) and thus non-
confidential and unpopular and thus potentially confidential data (Section 4). As noted
in the introduction of this section, since other teams researching secure deduplication set
different views and targets for their secure deduplication solutions, we provide extensive
comparison between our scheme and a few other representative secure deduplication works
both in terms of security and performance to demonstrate the similarities and differences
(Sections 6 and 7).
3.2 State of the Art – Related Work
3.2.1 Deduplication (Without Security)
Data deduplication is a very popular storage space optimization technique. Same as
other such techniques, the efficiency of deduplication is highly dependent on the dataset
it is being applied on – deduplication is totally ineffective for datasets composed solely
of unique data with no duplicates and can be very efficient for scenarios where datasets
contain a lot of duplicate data. A compact description of how to measure deduplication
efficiency and what it depends on was provided by Dutch [2]. Harnik et al. [14] commented
on the complexity of deduplication efficiency estimation and presented a novel algorithm
to estimate it, providing both formal and empirical results for their approach.
Many research works focused on the analysis of efficiency of deduplication itself, omit-
ting its (in)security. Meister and Brinkmann [15] studied the influence of different chunk-
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ing approaches on multiple levels and analyzed how changes in the dataset influence
deduplication efficiency based on the chosen chunking approach. Mandagere et al. [16]
provided a comprehensive deduplication taxonomy and compared the different dedupli-
cation approaches using real-world data, measuring not only deduplication efficiency but
also consumed system and time resources.
Aronovich et al. [17] focused on optimization of known deduplication strategies and
proposed a novel similarity-based deduplication system. Instead of using classical hash-
based indexing function for data comparison, the proposal uses a more cost-effective
solution based on similarity signatures and discusses the possibilities how to combine this
new approach with the existing one to optimize deduplication systems.
Zhao et al. [18] present a novel scalable deduplication file system for virtual machine
images. This work demonstrates that there are various ways of introducing deduplication
into cloud deployments to achieve better resource utilization.
3.2.2 Convergent Encryption
The first work that considered security in a deduplication setting was published by
Douceur et al. [3]. While the primary goal of the published research was to reclaim space
from duplicate files in a distributed file system, the work focused also on the possibility
how to combine data confidentiality (i.e. encryption) and deduplication and introduced
convergent encryption to be used for this purpose. It is worth noting that the information
leakage identified as exploitable later by Harnik et al. [4] was openly accepted by Douceur
et al.– their formal security proof was stating, that “convergent encryption deliberately
leaks a controlled amount of information” and they only proved that “we are not acciden-
tally leaking more information than we intend”. The leakage was not seen as a security
issue.
Storer et al. [19] published a paper introducing two secure data deduplication mod-
els – authenticated and anonymous. The protection mechanism of choice in both cases
was convergent encryption and, unfortunately, the security analysis was focusing on ad-
versaries attacking the storage service itself rather than analyzing the properties of the
underlying deterministic convergent encryption. The information-leakage-based attacks
were not considered.
Deduplication research took a major turn towards security in 2010 when Harnik et
al. [4] presented how information leakage caused by client-side (source-based) dedupli-
cation can be exploited to mount three types of attack – identifying files, learning file
contents and misusing a deduplication-enabled storage as a covert communication chan-
nel.
To prevent inadvertent omissions of risks stemming from convergent encryption, Bel-
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lare et al. [7] formalized convergent encryption under the name message-locked encryp-
tion. As expected, the security analysis presented in [7] highlights that message-locked
encryption offers confidentiality for unpredictable messages only, clearly failing to achieve
semantic security.
While not strictly security-oriented, Lou et al. [20] noticed that key management in
the convergent encryption setup can be quite challenging and aims to solve the problem
in an easy-to-handle way. The presented solution solves the key management issue quite
neatly though it does not address the security weakness of convergent encryption in any
way.
3.2.3 Secure Deduplication Solutions (post convergent encryp-
tion only)
Bellare et al. present DupLESS [5], a server-aided encryption for deduplicated stor-
age. Similarly to our proposed solution, DupLESS uses a modified convergent encryption
scheme with the aid of a secure component for key generation. In DupLESS, clients en-
crypt files using message-based keys obtained from a key-server via an oblivious PRF
protocol. This approach enables clients to store encrypted data with an existing storage
service, have the service perform deduplication on their behalf, and yet achieves strong
confidentiality guarantees.While DupLESS offers the possibility to securely use server-
side (target-based) deduplication, our scheme aims at secure client-side (source-based)
deduplication to take advantage of the bandwidth savings.
Puzio et al. [21] present ClouDedup, a solution based on convergent encryption strength-
ened by additional encryption provided by a trusted metadata manager. To achieve as
best efficiency as possible, ClouDedup offers fine-grained block-level deduplication and
addresses the related issue of key management by introducing another component han-
dling key management together with the actual per-block deduplication. The proposed
solution is technically similar to ours, but the metadata manager is quite complex and
also responsible for the actual data transfer, which we try to avoid to prevent existence
of a single point of potential data leakage.
Armknecht et al. present ClearBox [22], a gateway-aided encryption for deduplication
storage with built-in Proof of Ownership mechanism and transparent deduplication pat-
tern attestation. ClearBox extends the primary goal of securing data privacy by enabling
cloud users to verify the effective storage space that their data is occupying in the cloud,
and consequently to check whether they qualify for benefits such as price reductions, etc.
Our solution lacks the built-in PoW but offers additional flexibility for potentially sensi-
tive files – if their eventual deduplication is acceptable, the user does not have to treat
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them differently and they are still strongly protected while unpopular.
Liu et al. [23] present a solution based on a password-authenticated key-exchange
(PAKE) protocol to alleviate the need for a trusted third party. In a PAKE setup the
deduplication information is distributed among the users of the system and the users are
required to be on-line to participate in the deduplication process. This setting notably
limits the processing that needs to be handled by the storage provider and prevent an
honest but curious storage provider from getting contents of files stored by the users yet
it puts more processing and requirements on the users, needing them to participate when
deduplication of files that they also stored is required. Our solution aims to minimize the
necessity of user involvement, even though it does require a trusted third party to work.
Meye et al. [24] present a two-phase data deduplication scheme trying to solve the
known convergent encryption issues. While the work methodically addresses each issue
and presents per-issue solutions including proofs, the proposed solutions are often quite
inefficient with respect to practical usability (e.g. masking deduplication with bogus
transfer). We strive to address all the issues in a compact one-solution way.
Duan [25] presents a solution similar to that of DupLESS [5] but instead of a one-
component key server he suggests using a threshold scheme for pseudo-convergent key
generation. Using a threshold component is similar to our proposal, even though it is
used for a different purpose.
Xu et al. [26] present a Proof of Ownership-incorporating secure deduplication scheme
allowing client-side deduplication in a weak-bounded-leakage setting. Security proof in a
random oracle model for the solution is provided, however, the weak leakage setting is a
quite strong assumption and low-entropy files are not being addressed. Our solution aims
specifically to cover also the low-entropy files that pose the greatest risk in the “learning
file contents” attack.
Li et al. [27] present a solution based on hybrid cloud – trusted private cloud is used
for sensitive metadata management and public cloud is used for the actual data storage.
The solution provides authorized deduplication, adding user roles and priviliges to the
standard deduplication setting and additionally incorporates also the Proof of Ownership
mechanism. While provably secure in the presented security model, the solution requires
trusted private cloud and does not eliminate the vulnerabilities pointed out by Harnik et
al. [4] for users with overlapping privileges. Our solution aims to eliminate the mentioned
vulnerabilities for unpopular files.
Chia-Mu [28] presents two novel variants of secure deduplication schemes abbreviated
SDedup and XDedup. The schemes combine the approach of DupLESS [5] with the
approach of Liu et al. [23] and are based on a Merkle puzzle. While being secure against
user-adversaries, the cloud storage provider is given the deduplication index of the stored
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files allowing him to mount attacks based on this information.
3.2.4 Proofs of Ownership (PoW)
Apart from attacks identified by Harnik et al. [4] one more attack vector against source-
based deduplication was identified by Halevi et al. [29] – deduplication allows to obtain a
potentially large file stored by a legitimate user by presenting only the short deduplication
index. Since deduplication identifies files via indexes, a user that does not own a file but
possesses its deduplication index can falsely ask to store the file identified by this index.
Since deduplication is enabled, the actual file upload would not be required and the user
will become one of the legitimate owners of the file and can thus download it from the
storage. Note that the same weakness can be used to misuse a deduplication-enabled
storage as a content distribution network (upload file once, distribute hash, download
many times). To thwart such attacks, Halevi et al. [29] introduced the concept of Proof
of Ownership (PoW) – the user is first required to prove that he really has the file before
the file is deduplicated and he is accepted as its rightful owner.
The proofs of ownership were researched e.g. by DiPietro and Sorniotti [30], dif-
ferent variants were suggested and optimized [31]. Note that while mitigating another
deduplication weakness, proofs of ownership are somewhat parallel to the “core” secure
deduplication research as they do not target the issue of end-user data confidentiality.
Indeed, PoWs can be often used along the other listed secure deduplication solutions
(with some exceptions that already bundle them in the solution, such as the works by
Armknecht et al. [22], Xu et al. [26] or Li et al. [27]).
Chapter 4
Proposed Solution – Principles and
Overview
This chapter provides a compact overview of our proposed secure data deduplication
solution, summarizing the requirements it tries to satisfy and the principles employed
to do so. We start with a short explanation of suitability of our solution for different
scenarios and follow with a description of the core principle our solution builds upon and
how the whole proposed secure data deduplication scheme is organized.
4.1 Introduction
As the analyses demonstrated (e.g. [2, 14]), efficiency of each deduplication system is
highly dependent on the actual type (and structure) of data expected to be stored. Our
secure data deduplication solution was designed with the idea of popular multi-user cloud
data storages in mind but is generally applicable in many scenarios where cross-user
deduplication is deployed. In this respect, our scheme was tailored specifically for datasets
likely to contain relatively few instances of some data items and many instances of others
which is what we expect from a typical multi-user cloud data storage. Other scenarios
where our solution is expected to have good efficiency are e.g. those working with datasets
generated by backup tools for multiple machines and users, hypervisors handling linked
clones of VM-images for many clients and alike. Notice that the more duplicates there are
in the dataset, the better efficiency of our solution is. On the other hand the efficiency
of our solution would be very low for scenarios with low numbers of users or with low
presence of duplicates. We analyse the efficiency in-detail in Section 7.
The main intuition behind our scheme is that, in general, different data require dif-
ferent degrees of protection. Indeed, organizations such as governments, agencies and
companies typically do have a classification system that categorizes every file based on
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its contents into a clearly-defined class (e.g. top secret, confidential, public) and do have
policies corresponding to these categories (e.g. top secret must be always encrypted by
AES-256-CBC in transit and storage and must never leave the secure perimeter of the
intranet; public is published on the web in documents archive). Unfortunately, in the case
of user-managed data there are typically no classes and no universal metrics, recommen-
dations or algorithms that could be used to categorize data. Even worse, it is practically
impossible to design such sorting mechanisms based on the data contents only since the
required degree of protection is typically unique per-file. To give an example – a computer
game configuration file would likely be less important than a personal photo, unless the
file was tuned by the gamer specifically to give him an edge in the game and the photo is
already published on multiple social networks, in which case the importance is reversed.
To solve this “unsolvable” issue, we propose a popularity principle for categorization –
instead of deciding based on data contents, we suggest deciding based on how popular a
datum is (e.g. how many users already own it).
The popularity principle is an implementation of the saying that “open secret is not
a secret”. Phrased differently, if “almost everyone already knows it”, there is no point
in trying to keep it secret. Based on this principle, data can be either categorized as
unpopular (known/owned by a few users only) which require strong protection or as
popular (known/owned by many users) which do not require such a strong protection (still
some protection can be useful; even popular data must not be “given for free to anyone”).
In the world of multi-user cloud storage services, the implementation is straightforward
in theory – protect the data “strongly” until they are uploaded by “enough” users and
then weaken the protection. And that is exactly what we propose in our secure data
deduplication scheme: defining what is “strong protection”, “weak protection” and how
to set the “engouh” a bit more formally.
To implement the data classification idea and the popularity principle in our secure
data deduplication solution we use a cryptographic construct called multi-layered cryp-
tosystem. All files are initially declared unpopular and are encrypted with two layers, as
illustrated in Figure 4.1: the inner layer is applied using convergent encryption (“weaker
encryption”), whereas the outer layer is applied using a semantically secure cryptosystem
(“stronger encryption”). Uploaders of an unpopular file provide not only the ciphertext
but also a decryption share usable to reconstruct the key for the upper encryption layer
once enough shares are collected. The decryption shares are stored together with their
convergent index (i.e. hash of their convergent ciphertext) by a trusted third party (TTP).
In this way, when sufficient distinct copies of an unpopular file have been uploaded, the
upper layer can be removed. This step has two consequences:
1. security notion for the now popular file is downgraded from semantic to standard
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Figure 4.1: The multi-layered cryptosystem used in our scheme. Unpopular files (F2 and
F3) are protected using two layers, whereas for popular files (F1 and F4), the outer layer
can be removed. The inner layer is obtained through convergent encryption that generates
identical ciphertext at each invocation on the same file. The outer layer (for unpopular
files) is obtained through a semantically secure cryptosystem.
convergent (see [7]), and
2. properties of the remaining convergent encryption layer allow deduplication to hap-
pen naturally.
Security is thus traded for storage efficiency, as for every file that transits from unpopular
to popular status, storage space can be reclaimed. Once a file reaches the popular status,
space is reclaimed for the copies uploaded so far, and normal deduplication can take place
for future copies.
There are two further challenges in the secure design of this scheme. Firstly, without
proper identity management, Sybil attacks [32] could be mounted by spawning sufficient
Sybil accounts to force a file to become popular: in this way, the semantically secure
encryption layer could be forced off and information could be inferred on the content of
the file, whose only remaining protection is the weaker convergent layer. While this is
acceptable for popular files (provided that storage efficiency is an objective), it is not
for unpopular files whose content – we postulate – has to enjoy stronger protection. The
second issue relates to the need of every deduplicating system to group uploads of the same
content. In client-side (source-based) deduplicating systems, this is usually accomplished
through an index (also called tag or locator) computed deterministically from the content
of the file so that all uploading users compute the same. The client then provides only the
index to the storage provider who checks whether he already stores data associated to the
same index. If so, data upload is unnecessary. However, the index leaks information about
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the content of the file and therefore violates semantic security which is unacceptable for
unpopular files. Deduplication systems using plain convergent encryption compute the
index from the convergent ciphertext, thus the same weakness holds. We tackle these
issues by introducing two additional entities in our system model.
4.2 System Model
Our solution focuses primarily on the scenario of multi-user cloud storage services and
requires strict user authentication and obfuscation of the deduplication index (see Sec-
tion 4.1). Our system model is composed of:
• users of the system (physical beings)
• a set of user identities Ui ∈ U identifying users participating in the system (using
the cloud storage service)
• storage provider S offering storage services
• identity provider (IdP) is a trusted third party (TTP) deploying a strict user
identity control and hinders Sybil attacks
• index repository service (IRS) is a TTP providing secure indexation for unpop-
ular files
A user who wants to start using the storage service is required to register by the IdP to
be assigned a user identity Ui used during interaction with other system participants. As
the user, as physical entity, is not identified by any other means than by user identity Ui
(in this work), we often simply refer to “user Ui” meaning the user that was assigned user
identity Ui by IdP when joining the system. The actual implementation of IdP or concrete
structure of the user identity are transparent from the system point of view and can be
implemented by any existing registration mechanism. The only requirement is that IdP
does not assign multiple identites to one physical user. Similarly, S stands for the storage
provider, but is often used meaning the storage provider service as a whole.
Once the user joins the system he can start using the storage service. A file is iden-
tified within S via a unique file identifier (I), which is issued by the index repository
service IRS during the file upload process. The IRS also maintains a record of how many
distinct users have uploaded a file and stores also the associated decryption shares. The
concrete algorithms provided by the system are described in Section 5, an overview of
user interaction during the registration process and during an unpopular file upload are
shown in Figure 4.2.
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Figure 4.2: Illustration of our system model. The schematic shows the main four entities
and their interaction for registration and unpopular file upload process.
4.3 Security Model
The primary objective of our scheme is the confidentiality of user content. Specifically,
two different security notions, depending on the nature of each datum, are achieved:
1. Semantic security [13] for unpopular data;
2. Conventional convergent security [7] for popular data.
Note that integrity and data origin authentication exceed the scope of this work. The issue
of deduplication index misuse to fake data ownership is also not addressed inherently by
our scheme, but many of the proposed proof of ownership solutions [29–31] are compatible
with our scheme and can be deployed to address this issue.
In our security model, the storage provider S is honest but curious (HBC) – he is
trusted to reliably store data on behalf of users and make it available to any user upon
request but might be interested in compromising the confidentiality of user content or
controlled by the adversary. We also assume that the adversary can control (corrupt) up
to nA users and that the goal of the adversary is only limited to breaking the confidentiality
of content uploaded by honest users.
To be able to model security formally, we need to first formally define popularity. We
introduce a system-wide popularity limit, plim, which represents the smallest number of
distinct, legitimate users that need to upload a given file F for that file to be declared
popular. Note that plim does not account for malicious uploads. Based on plim and nA, we
can then introduce the threshold t of our system, which is set to be t ≥ plim +nA. Setting
the global system threshold to t ensures that the adversary cannot use its control over
nA users to subvert the popularity mechanism and force an unpopular file of its choice to
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become popular. A file shall therefore be declared popular when at least t uploads for it
have taken place. Note that this accounts for nA possibly malicious uploads.
Fixing a single threshold t arguably reduces the flexibility of the scheme. While for
the sake of simplicity of notation we stick to a single threshold in our work, extension to
multiple thresholds is possible quite straightforwardly albeit for the cost of performance
decrease. The simplest way of relaxing the single-threshold requirement would be to create
multiple instances of the scheme, each with different values of t, and issue as many keys to
each user. Naturally, the higher the value of threshold t, the more copies are required for
a file to become popular. Storage provider could use this difference e.g. to set different
pricing levels (higher t means more storage required, means more expensive). Users are
then free to choose the threshold that best fits their need (e.g. highest for financial data,
lowest for common stuff etc.). Note that a file uploaded with a given threshold t1 does
not count towards popularity for the same file uploaded with a different threshold t2
(necessary performance decrease since otherwise malicious users could easily compromise
the popularity principle to extract information of a file encrypted with higher threshold
using the lower threshold). Additionally, a label identifying the chosen threshold (which
does not leak other information) must be uploaded together with the ciphertext and the
index repository service needs to be modified to keep indexes for a given file and threshold
separate from those of the same file but different thresholds.
The IRS and IdP are modeled as trusted third parties (TTP) and thus assumed to
be trusted and to abide by the protocol specifications. If either of these components
gets compromised by the adversary then the security of all user content is degraded to
standard conventional convergent security (i.e. the semantic security of unpopular files is
lost). We provide more detailed analysis of potential corruption consequences and discuss
possibilities how to alleviate this limitation in Section 6.
Chapter 5
Proposed Solution – Algorithms and
Implementation
In this chapter we describe a secure deduplication scheme based on the concept of popu-
larity. Our scheme guarantees semantic security for unpopular data (where deduplication
is not possible) and enables their automatic transparent transition to only convergently
encrypted (and thus deduplicable) popular data.
The core of the scheme is formed by a threshold convergent cryptosystem Eµ described
in Section 5.1 and two trusted third parties – the identity provider IdP and the index
repository service IRS described in Section 5.2. The scheme as a whole is presented in
Section 5.3 together with the algorithms it is composed of.
5.1 Threshold Convergent Cryptosystem Eµ
Eµ is a special-purpose threshold cryptosystem that allows all users to encrypt arbitrary
messages m of fixed length λ associated with some label ` in such a way that once
enough (more than some threshold t) of the users provide their decryption shares (created
using the same label `), all the messages associated with ` can be decrypted. Differently
from classic threshold cryptosystems described in Section 2.2.4, the Encrypt interface now
includes the added label ` and the decryption process is designed to be non-interactive.
Additionally, modification of the DShare interface is required – the decryption share is
created using the label l instead of using the ciphertext c and is stored in some repository
(separately from the ciphertext) until required for decryption. Note that the modifications
enable multiple different plaintext messages to be associated with the same label during
encryption and thus the same decryption shares (once enough are collected) can be used
to decrypt all of them. This makes the cryptosystem flexible and usable in different
scenarios, even though we do not use this property in our scheme.
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For the purpose of the Eµ cryptosystem as well as in the remainder of this paper we
will make use of Λ = {λ, q,G1,G2,GT , g, g¯, eˆ} where λ is a security parameter which corre-
sponds to the bitlength of the exploited symmetric encryption scheme key and determines
the bitsize of prime q (for 128-bit security one would set λ to 128 and bitsize of q two
times larger i.e. |q| = 256 as recommended in the literature [33, 34]). G1,G2,GT are pair-
ing groups satisfying the Symmetric eXternal Diffie–Hellman (SXDH) assumption [35];
G1 = 〈g〉, G2 = 〈g¯〉 are of prime order q, and eˆ : G1 × G2 → GT is an efficiently com-
putable, non-degenerate bilinear pairing. SXDH requires the decisional Diffie–Hellman
problem (DDH) to be intractable in both G1 and G2. We will also use two cryptographic
hash functions H1 : {0, 1}∗ → G1 and H2 : GT → {0, 1}λ, a semantically secure symmetric
cryptosystem E and a convergent encryption scheme Ec. t is used to denote the threshold
i.e. the number of decryption shares necessary to decrypt a ciphertext (both decryption
shares and ciphertext must be generated using the same label `).
Cryptosystem Eµ is defined as a tuple (Setup, Encrypt, DShare, Decrypt), consisting of
four probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms (in terms of a security parameter 1λ) with
the following properties:
Eµ.Setup
(
λ, n, t
)→ (pk, sk,{(ri, ski)}ni=1): at first, Λ is generated as described in the pre-
vious paragraph. Next, let secret key sk←R Z and generate n key shares
{(
ri, ski
)}n
i=1
such that any set of t shares can be used to reconstruct sk [6]. Also, let g¯pub ← g¯sk.
Public key pk is set to
{
Λ, H1, H2, g¯pub
}
Eµ.Encrypt
(
pk, `,m
) → (c): Let r ←R Z and let E ← eˆ (H1(`), g¯pub)r. Next, set
c1 ← H2
(
E
)⊕m, c2 ← g¯r. Compose the ciphertext c as (c1, c2).
Eµ.DShare
(
ri, ski, `
)→ (ri, dsi): let dsi ← H1(`)ski .
Eµ.Decrypt
(
c; St =
{(
ri, dsi)
})→ (m): parse c as (c1, c2). Using all decryption shares in
St compute
∏
(ri,dsi)∈St
dsi
λ
St
0,ri =
∏
(ri,ski)∈S′t
H1(`)
skiλ
St
0,ri = H1(`)
∑
(ri,ski)∈S
′
t
skiλ
St
0,ri
= H1(`)
sk
where λSt0,ri are the Lagrangian coefficients of the polynomial with interpolation points
from the set S
′
t = {(rij , skij)}t−1j=0. Note that sk cannot be reconstructed from neither
the decryption shares nor from H1(`)
sk.
Thanks to the properties of bilinear pairings it holds that:
∀x : eˆ (H1(`)x, g¯r) = eˆ (H1(`), g¯)rx = eˆ (H1(`), g¯x)r
CHAPTER 5. PROPOSED SOLUTION – ALGORITHMS AND IMPL. 31
Setting x = sk, we get:
eˆ
(
H1(`)
sk, g¯r
)
= eˆ (H1(`), g¯)
rsk = eˆ (H1(`), g¯
x)sk
Using c1 = H2
(
E
) ⊕m, c2 = g¯r and H1(`)sk we can now decrypt m by computing
Eˆ as eˆ
(
H1(`)
sk, c2
)
and m = c1 ⊕H2(Eˆ).
This equality satisfies considerations on the correctness of Eµ.
Eµ has a few noteworthy properties:
1. The decryption algorithm is non-interactive, meaning that it does not require live
participation of the entities that executed the Eµ.DShare algorithm;
2. It mimics convergent encryption in that the decryption shares are deterministically
dependent on the plaintext label. However, in contrast to plain convergent encryp-
tion, the label does not need to be related to the actual message being encrypted
in any way and if it is not (such as in our scheme presented in the next section), it
cannot leak any information about it;
3. The cryptosystem can be reused for an arbitrary number of messages, i.e., the
Eµ.Setup algorithm should only be executed once.
Finally, note that it is possible to generate more shares skj (j > n) anytime after the
execution of the Eµ.Setup algorithm, to allow new users to join the system even if all the
original n key-shares were already assigned.
5.2 The Role of Scheme Participants
Apart from typical deduplication scheme participants – the user wanting to store his
data remotely and the storage provider offering his service and wanting to benefit from
deduplication, our scheme requires the presence of two additional entities – the identity
provider IdP and the index repository service IRS.
IdP serves as the identity authority as well as the trusted dealer of the secret shares
of the Eµ master secret. Upon scheme deployment, IdP is responsible for execution of
Eµ.Setup. Each user interacts with IdP only once, when joining the scheme, and the
interaction only includes IdP ensuring that the user is new (i.e. hasn’t participated in
the scheme yet) and providing the identity credentials and secret share. Security-wise,
IdP is used to hinder exploitation of the threshold cryptosystem Eµ by means of Sybil
attacks [32] and master secret leakage.
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IRS serves as a secure index generator and decryption share storage. To store data, IRS
maintains an associative array DBIRS[IFc ] with three fields: DBIRS[IFc ].ctr - counter keeping
track of how many different users uploaded data to this record; DBIRS[IFc ].idxes - random
index used by the user to identify data corresponding to encrypted Fc in the storage
provider space; DBIRS[IF ].dshares - decryption shares associated with IFc . The array
is initialized empty and the records are added according to GenSecIdx implementation
(Figure 5.1). The associative array is indexed by IF defined in Section 4.2. IF is then
disclosed to the storage provider S during Put. Being generated deterministically, IF
leaks information about file contents (notice that convergent encryption does not fix this
leakage since the encryption is deterministic too). IRS is used to prevent this leakage
by offering its secure index generation service GenSecIdx (Figure 5.1) to the user – for a
(leaky) convergent index IFc the user is given a random index Irnd. Note that if the user
invokes GenSecIdx more times with the same IFc he will always get the same index Irnd
and the popularity counter will not increase. This prevents potentially corrupted user to
force state transition of an unpopular file. Another, albeit much more limited, leakage
could occur through the decryption shares used in Eµ– encryptions using the same ` (and
pk) by the same user Ui produce equal decryption shares, thus leaking information that
the ciphertexts were encrypted using the same label. To prevent this leakage, instead of
storing the decryption share together with the ciphertext to S, we store it separately to
IRS. To suit the needs of our scheme, the decryption share store request is grouped with
the secure index generation request in GenSecIdx. Additionally, if the stored decryption
share was not yet used in the decryption process, the user is allowed to delete it from IRS
via RemDShare (Figure 5.2).
IRS: if (DBIRS[IFc ].ctr ≥ t)
IRS −→ Ui: return IFc
IRS: Irnd ← PRF(σ,Ui||IFc)
if (Irnd /∈ DBIRS[IFc ].idxes)
increment DBIRS[IFc ].ctr
add Irnd to DBIRS[IFc ].idxes
add (ri, dsi) to DBIRS[IFc ].dshares
if (DBIRS[IFc ].ctr = t)
IRS −→ S: Deduplicate(DBIRS[IFc ].idxes,
DBIRS[IFc ].dshares)
IRS −→ Ui: return Irnd
Figure 5.1: The GenSecIdx(IFc , (ri, dsi)) algorithm. Popularity is evaluated by comparison
of per-index counter and threshold t. Behaviour corresponding to a popular file index is
highlighted in green (the lightest color), unpopular file index part is in blue (the darkest
color) and part corresponding to popularity switch is in red.Note that the last line is com-
mon to both unpopular and switching state situations. The complementary Deduplicate
implementation is described in Section 5.3.
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IRS: if(Irnd ∈ DBIRS[IFc ].idxes)
with DBIRS[IFc ] do
.idxes← .idxes \ {Irnd}
.dshares← .dshares \ (ri, dsi)
.ctr← .ctr − 1
Figure 5.2: The RemDShare(IFc , Irnd, ri) algorithm.
Implementation-wise, IRS uses a Pseudo-Random Function (PRF) that takes a concate-
nation of the requesting user identity Ui and convergent index IFc on the input (domain),
uses a secret seed σ of length λ (key) and produces a random index Irnd (range) i.e.
PRF : {0, 1}λ×{0, 1}|Ui|+κ → {0, 1}κ. σ is generated upon IRS instantiation once and used
in each invocation of PRF, to assure that same input always generates same output.
5.3 Storage Scheme
We formally introduce our scheme, detailing the interactions between a set of n users Ui,
a storage provider S and the two trusted entities, the identity provider IdP and the index
repository service IRS.
S is modeled as an indexed associative array DBS supporting the Put, Get and Delete
operations, same as the deduplication model described in Section 2.1. IRS is modeled as
described in Section 5.2. Examples of the the records maintained by S and the records of
IRS are available in Fig. 5.3.
E is a semantically secure (indistinguishable under chosen-plaintext attack; IND-CPA)
symmetric cryptosystem and Ec is a convergent encryption scheme (see Section 2.2). Eµ
is our convergent threshold cryptosystem.
When a new user wants to join the scheme, she contacts IdP in a secure way. IdP
verifies her identity; upon successful verification, it issues user credentials Ui and a secret
IRS
index ctr idxes dshares
1A35BC127CC36958 51 ∅ ∅
82090A161718192A 2
{A112927132910012, {(1302;1A85227..),
C05B228C48371BC7} (0124;545D114..)}
S
index data owners
1A35BC127CC36958 1B100510955476AC4125.. 0015,0098,1023,..
A112927132910012 DD845A3362C5487FF14.. 1302
C05B228C48371BC7 1CAA5767052A4443720.. 0124
Figure 5.3: Examples of S and IRS records. Note that threshold t is set to 50 for this
example. Index starting 1A represents a popular file, Index starting 82 an unpopular file.
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key share ski (generating a brand new ski if necessary). From this point onwards, the user
becomes the user Ui towards other participants in the scheme.
For simplicity and clarity, the core API offers only three user-invoked algorithms –
Upload to put data into the storage, Download to get data from the storage and Remove
to erase data from the storage. To keep complexity at a reasonable level we intentionally
do not provide extended API, but any functionality achievable in classic deduplication
schemes should be achievable in our scheme too since the scheme design does not generally
limit the functionality.
The initial deployment of the scheme starts with the Init algorithm:
Init: IdP executes Eµ.Setup, publishes the public key pk and keeps key shares {ski}n−1i=0
secret. The algorithm is run only once throughout the whole lifetime of the scheme.
Invoking Init again corresponds to deployment of a new scheme.
Once the scheme is initialized, all interaction is always started by the user invoking
once of the three following algorithms:
Upload(F,Ui)[Fig. 5.4]: The user Ui encrypts file F convergently and generates the index
IFc which he uses in request to IRS.
If IRS returns the index unchanged then the file is already popular and the
following Put operation only adds the invoking user into the list of owners for file
Fc, no data upload occurs. The user then stores the index IFc and the convergent
key kc to be able to download his file in the future.
If IRS returns a different index Irnd then the file is unpopular and it is neces-
sary to encrypt the convergent ciphertext again, using a random key k and encrypt
the random key k using the convergent threshold cryptosystem with label Fc. The
doubly-encrypted file together with the encrypted random key are then transferred
to the storage during the Put operation. This way, the unpopular file will be se-
mantically secure until there are more than t of its copies uploaded. The user stores
the index obtained from the IRS and the random key together with the convergent
key and the convergent index.
Note that transition from unpopular to popular state is indeed triggered by the
Upload algorithm but does not influence its actual processing. Upload is always
processed the same way as described in Fig. 5.4. If the file state transition (dedu-
plication) is to take place it is triggered during GenSecIdx processing and managed
by Deduplicate (see Fig. 5.1 and Fig. 5.7)
Note that additional strengthening measures can be deployed at S to improve the
security provided (such as PoW [29] that allow checking, whether the user really
owns the popular file he tries to upload).
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Ui: kc ← Ec.K(F )
Fc ← Ec.E(kc, F )
IFc ← I(Fc)
(ri, dsi)← Eµ.DShare(ri, ski, Fc)
Ui −→ IRS: Iret ← GenSecIdx(IFc , (ri, dsi))
Ui: if(Iret = IFc)
Ui −→ S: Put(IFc ,Ui, Fc)
Ui: F ← (kc, IFc)
else
Ui: k ← E .K();
c← E .E(k, Fc)
cµ ← Eµ.Encrypt(pk, Fc, k)
F ′ ← (c, cµ)
Ui −→ S: Put(Iret,Ui, F ′)
Ui: F ← (k, Iret, kc, IFc)
Figure 5.4: The Upload(F,Ui) algorithm. Popular file upload part is highlighted in green
(lighter color), unpopular file upload part in blue (darker color).
Download(F,Ui)[Fig. 5.5]: If the user uploaded the file as unpopular (i.e. F = (k, Iret, kc,
IFc)) he first tries to get it from the Iret index location. If he succeeds, he can decrypt
the unpopular content to recover his file. If he fails, the file must have gotten popular
in the meantime so he replaces F (i.e. F = (kc, IFc)) and retries the download. If
the file is popular, the user gets the popular content from IFc and he can decrypt it
to recover his file.
Ui: if(F = (k, Iret, kc, IFc))
Ui −→ S: ret← Get(Iret,Ui)
Ui: if(ret 6= error)
ret → (c, cµ); Fc ← E .D(k, c)
F ← Ec.D(kc, Fc)
else
F ← (kc, IFc); Download(F,Ui)
else
Ui −→ S: ret← Get(IFc ,Ui)
Ui: if(ret = error)
download failed
else
ret → Fc; F ← Ec.D(kc, Fc)
Figure 5.5: The Download(F,Ui) algorithm. Unpopular file download part is highlighted
in blue (the darkest color), part corresponding to file switch caused by the file being
uploaded as unpopular but changed status to popular before download is in red and
popular file download part is in green (the lightest color).
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Remove(F,Ui)[Fig. 5.6]: If the file is unpopular, the user first tries to delete it as un-
popular (i.e. invokes Delete(Iret,Ui)) and, if he succeeds, he additionally requests
removal of his decryption share from the IRS database. If he fails then the file
got popular in the meantime and he deletes it as popular. Popular file deletion is
straight invocation of Delete(IFc ,Ui).
Note that a file that is popular can never become unpopular again and the Remove
algorithm is designed to prohibit such a transition. Allowing a popular file to become
unpopular would break the scheme security properties.
Notice that secure deletion of content requires storage provider S to be trusted, while
it is “honest but curious” in our setting. Therefore S may well pretend to delete
the actual content, and yet store it for later information extraction (notice that this
makes sense for unpopular files only). However, the index repository service, which
is a trusted entity, would perform the deletion step honestly by removing the random
index and the corresponding decryption share generated for the file and decreasing
the popularity. This alone however does not guarantee any security. Indeed, we
may be faced with the scenario in which the popularity threshold has not yet been
reached (that is, the storage provider has not been given the set of indexes), and yet
more than t encrypted contents exist at unknown locations (since S didn’t delete
some of them when it properly should). However, since S does not know which
indexes are the “right ones” and the ciphertexts cannot be linked by any means
(no information can be extracted, as we prove in section 6), the only gain for S for
not deleting the file contents when supposed to is to have some storage occupied by
useless data (useless since the legitimate user who wanted to download it deletes his
local copies of decryption keys and thus the encrypted data become irrecoverable).
Ui: if(F = (k, Iret, kc, IFc))
Ui −→ S: ret← Delete(Iret,Ui)
Ui: if(ret 6= error)
RemDShare(IFc , Iret, ri)
else
F ← (kc, IFc); Remove(F,Ui)
else
ret← Delete(IFc ,Ui)
if(ret = error)
remove failed
Figure 5.6: The Remove(F,Ui) algorithm. Unpopular file remove part is highlighted in
blue (the darkest color), part corresponding to file switch caused by the file being uploaded
as unpopular but changed status to popular before removal is in red and popular file
remove part is in green (the lightest color).
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Deduplicate(idxes, dshares)[Fig. 5.7]: With the deduplication request from IRS, S receives
t indexes and t decryption shares. S checks that records for all provided indexes
exist and if not, it waits (synchronization purpose, waiting for the last copy of F
to be uploaded). S recovers the decryption keys using the decryption shares and
decrypts all the data contents of all the indexes provided in the notification (for
performance reasons, decryption of a subset of indexes is preferable). As a result,
S ideally obtains t equal convergent ciphertexts, computes the “convergent index”
IFc = I(Fc), stores the ciphertext to a new record under the convergent index IFc
and deletes all the now-excessive copies. If the convergent ciphertexts differ then
some of the uploading users must have cheated; S aborts deduplication and leaves
the stored files unmodified. Optionally, S could notify IRS that deduplication failed
and allow it to collect additional decryption shares before trying deduplication again.
S: F ← ∅; U ← ∅
foreach(Ii ∈ idxes)
(c, cµ)← DBS[Ii].data
K ← Eµ.Decrypt(cµ, dshares)
Fc ← E .D(k, c)
F ← F ∪ {Fc}; U ← U ∪ DBS[Ii].users
forall(Fc ∈ F) check equality; fail → abort
IFc ← I(Fc)
execute Put(IFc ,U , Fc)
delete all records indexed by idxes
Figure 5.7: The Deduplicate(idxes, dshares) algorithm.
Chapter 6
Security Analysis
In this section we focus on the security aspect of our proposed secure deduplication scheme.
Since the proposed scheme is quite complex we first list all the cryptographic building
blocks (cryptosystems) and their respective usage in the scheme along with the data
that are being encrypted by the respective cryptosystems. Next we formally analyze the
security of the core building block of our scheme – the Eµ cryptosystem. Since the Eµ
cryptosystem introduces the concept of decryption shares we formally demonstrate that
the decryption shares themselves do not leak any information, specifically that it is not
possible to find out whether or not decryption shares were created using the same label.
Then we analyze the scheme as a whole, analyzing the view of each scheme participant and
discuss its corruptability as well as the possible information leakage caused by collusion
of corrupted participants. Finally, we provide comparison of security properties of our
scheme with other current secure deduplication proposals [5, 21–23].
6.1 Scheme Building Blocks – A Security Overview
Recall from Section 5, the proposed scheme incorporates three different cryptosystems –
a semantically secure symmetric cryptosystem E , a convergent encryption scheme Ec and
a novel convergent threshold cryptosystem Eµ. For a new file F to be processed by our
scheme we need to make sure it is first convergently encrypted (i.e. file contents encrypted
using a convergent encryption scheme) Fc = Ec.E(kF , F ) and a deduplication index IFc =
I(Fc) is computed over this convergently encrypted file. Next, the convergently encrypted
file has to be encrypted using a semantically secure cryptosystem with a random key
krnd, Fs = E .E(krnd, Fc) and the encryption key krnd used during this encryption must
be encrypted using Eµ : c = Eµ.Encrypt(pk, Fc, krnd) where pk is the public key of our
scheme. Finally, decryption share dsi = Eµ.DShare(ri, ski, `) must be computed to allow
later (during deduplication) to decrypt key krnd and transfer from unpopular file Fs to a
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popular file Fc. Note that to make sure that the decryption shares produced by Eµ will
correspond to the same convergently encrypted file, the whole convergently encrypted file
itself is used as a label for Eµ encryption and decryption share generation.
From a security standpoint, knowledge of the deduplication index I, convergently en-
crypted file Fc as well as knowledge of the decryption share dsi can be considered potential
threats if they constitute some leakage (i.e. can be used to devise some information about
the contents of the original file F ). Since I is deterministically computed from Fc which is
deterministically-encrypted with a deterministically-derived key from F , these two surely
do constitute a leakage and we eliminate this threat by letting only a trusted third party
IRS to know I for unpopular files (we discuss consequences of IRS corruption later in
this section). For popular files the leakage is accepted as reasonable. Whether or not
a decryption share constitutes a leakage is not directly clear (recall that Fc is used as a
label for
(
ri, dsi
)
creation). We therefore define a property of Eµ called “unlinkability of
decryption shares” that makes sure that decryption share does not leak any information
about the label it was created with (i.e. the convergently-encrypted Fc) and formally
prove it.
Note that we do not prove that E is semantically secure nor that Ec is convergently
secure, as we simply choose such cryptosystems that already meet these requirements. For
syntactical completeness we specify that “convergent security” as used in this work corre-
sponds to a formal definition of a PRV$-CDA STC message-locked encryption scheme [7].
6.2 Security Analysis of Eµ
Differently from classic encryption schemes Eµ produces not only ciphertexts but also
decryption shares. For a security analysis to be complete, we first address the decryption
shares and prove that they are “unlinkable” i.e. that they do not leak any information
about the label nor secret key share that they were created with. Informally, we show
that having multiple different decryption shares, there is no way of saying whether some
of them were created with the same label. We can postulate an even stronger property
that it is not possible to say whether or not they are valid decryption shares at all. Then
we analyse the security of the ciphertexts and show what the attacker is (or is not) able
to devise from the ciphertext.
Note that both the unlinkability of decryption shares and the security of the ciphertexts
is by design bounded by the number of corrupted users – if the attacker is able to corrupt
more than nA users (where nA must be lesser than t− plim − 1, see Section 4.3) then the
security is broken. This stems from the threshold nature of the cryptosystem and must
be always taken into account.
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6.2.1 Unlinkability of Decryption Shares
Informally, in DSµ-IND, the adversary is given access to two hash function oraclesOH1 , and
OH2 ; the adversary can corrupt an arbitrary number nA < t−plim−1 of pre-declared users,
and obtains their secret keys (i.e. key shares ski) through an oracle OCorrupt. Finally, the
adversary can access a decryption share oracle ODShare, submitting a label ` of her choice
and a non-corrupted user identity Ui. For each label that appears to ODShare-queries, the
challenger flips a fair coin flip b` and based on its outcome it responds with a properly
constructed decryption share that corresponds to label ` and secret key share ski as defined
in Eµ (when b` = 1), or with a random bitstring of the same length (when b` = 0). At the
end of the game, the adversary declares a label `∗, for which up to t− nA − 1 decryption
share queries for distinct user identities have been submitted. The adversary outputs a bit
b′`∗ and wins the game if b
′
`∗ = b`∗ . Eµ is said to satisfy unlinkability of decryption shares,
if no polynomial-time adversary can win the game with a non-negligible advantage.
Formally, unlinkability of decryption shares is defined using the experiment DSµ-IND
between an adversary A and a challenger C, given security parameter 1λ:
Setup Phase C executes the Eµ.Setup algorithm with λ, and generates a set of user
identities U = {Ui}n−1i=0 . Further, C gives pk to A and keeps {ski}n−1i=0 secret. At this
point, A declares the list UA of |UA| = nA < t− plim− 1 identities of users that will
later on be subject to OCorrupt calls.
Access to Oracles Throughout the game, the adversary can invoke oracles for the
hash functions H1 and H2. Additionally, the adversary can invoke the corrupt oracle
OCorrupt and receive the secret key share that corresponds to any user Ui ∈ UA.
Finally, A can invoke the decryption share oracle ODShare to request a decryption
share that corresponds to a specific label, say `, and the key share of a non-corrupted
user, say Ui /∈ UA. More specifically, for each label ` that appears in ODShare-queries,
the challenger chooses at random (based on a fair coin flip b`) whether to respond to
ODShare-queries for ` with decryption shares constructed as defined by the protocol,
or with random bitstrings of the same length. Let
(
ri, dsi
)
denote the response of
a ODShare-query for ` and Ui. b` = 1 corresponds to the case, where responses in
ODShare-queries for ` are properly constructed decryption shares.
Challenge Phase A chooses a target label `∗. The adversary is limited in the choice
of the challenge label as follows: `∗ must not have been the subject of more than
t − nA − 1 ODShare queries for distinct user identities. At the challenge time, if the
limit of t − nA − 1 has not been reached, the adversary is allowed to request for
more decryption shares for as long as the aforementioned condition holds. Recall
that C responds to challenge ODShare-queries based on b`∗ .
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Guessing Phase A outputs b′`∗ , that represents her guess for b`∗ . The adversary wins
the game, if b`∗ = b
′
`∗ .
The following lemma shows that unlinkability of decryption shares is guaranteed in Eµ
as long as the SXDH problem is intractable [35].
Lemma 6.2.1. Let H1and H2 be random oracles. If a DSµ-IND adversary A has a non-
negligible advantage AdvADSµ-IND := Pr[b
′
m∗ ← A(m∗, ds∗,m∗) : b′m∗ = bm∗ ] − 12 , then, a
probabilistic, polynomial-time algorithm C can create an environment where it uses A’s
advantage to solve any given instance of the SXDH problem.
Proof. SXDH assumes two groups of prime order q, G1, and G2, such that there is no
efficiently computable distortion map between the two; a bilinear group GT , and an
efficient, non-degenerate bilinear map eˆ : G1 × G2 → GT . In this setting, the Decisional
Diffie-Hellman (DDH) holds in both G1, and G2, and the bilinear decisional Diffie-
Hellman (BDDH) holds given the existence of eˆ [35].
Challenger C is given an SXDH context q′,G′1,G′2,G′T , eˆ′ and an instance of the DDH
problem 〈q′,G′1, g′, A = (g′)a, B = (g′)b,W 〉 in G′1. C simulates an environment in which
A operates, using its advantage in the game DSµ-IND to decide whether W = (g′)ab. C
interacts with A in the DSµ-IND game as follows:
Setup Phase C sets q ← q′, G1 ← G′1, G2 ← G′2, GT ← G′T , eˆ = eˆ′, g ← g′; picks a
random generator g¯ of G2 and sets g¯pub = (g¯)sk, where sk←R Z∗q. C also generates the set
of user identities U = {Ui}n−1i=0 . The public key pk = {q,G1,G2,GT eˆ,OH1 ,OH2 , g¯, g¯pub}
and U are forwarded to A. A declares the list UA of nA < t−plim−1 user identities that
will later on be subject to OCorrupt calls. Let UA = {Ui}nA−1i=0 . Next, C picks t− plim − 1
random integers yi ←R Z∗q. Let P be a t−plim−1 degree Lagrange polynomial implicitly
defined to satisfy P(0) = sk and P(i) = yi for i = 1, .., t− plim − 1. C then sets the key-
shares to (i, ski)← yi, i ∈ [1, t− plim − 1] and assigns (i, ski) for i ∈ [1, nA] to corrupted
users.
Access to Oracles C simulates oracles OH1 , OH2 , OCorrupt and ODShare:
OH1 : to respond to OH1-queries, C maintains a list of tuples {v, hv, ρv, cv} as explained
below. We refer to this list as OH1 list, and it is initially empty. When A submits an
OH1 query for v, C checks if v already appears in the OH1 list in a tuple {v, hv, ρv, cv}.
If so, C responds with H1(v) = hv. Otherwise, C picks ρv ←R Z∗q, and flips a coin
cv; cv flips to
′1′ with probability δ for some δ to be determined later. If cv equals
′0′, C responds H1(v) = hv = gρv and stores {v, hv, ρv, cv}; otherwise, she returns
H1(v) = hv = B
ρv and stores {v, hv, ρv, cv}.
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OH2 : The challenger C responds to a newly submitted OH2 query for v with a randomly
chosen hv ∈ GT . To be consistent in her OH2 responses, C maintains the history of
her responses in her local memory.
OCorrupt: C responds to a OCorrupt query involving user Ui ∈ UA, by returning the
coordinate yi chosen in the Setup Phase.
ODShare: simulation of ODShare is performed as follows. As before, C keeps track of
the submitted ODShare queries in her local memory. Let 〈Ui, `〉 be a decryption query
submitted for label ` and user identity Ui. If there is no entry in H1-list for `, then C
runs the OH1 algorithm for `. Let {`, h`, ρ`, c`} be the OH1 entry in C’s local memory
for label l. Let P′ ← P \ P(0). C responds with (ri, dsi) where ri corresponds to Ui
and dsi =
(
g
∑
(rj,skj)∈P′
skjλ
P′
ri,rj
Xλ
P′
ri,r0
)ρm
where X ← A iff c` = 0, and X ← W iff c` = 1.
In both cases, C keeps a record of her response in her local memory.
Challenge Phase A selects the challenge label `∗. Let the corresponding entry in the
OH1 list be {`∗, h`∗ , ρ`∗ , c`∗}. If c`∗ = 0, then C aborts.
Guessing Phase A outputs one bit b′`∗ representing the guess for b`∗ . C responds
positively to the DDH challenger if b′`∗ = 0, and negatively otherwise.
It is easy to see, that if A’s answer is ′0′, it means that the ODShare responses for `∗
constitute properly structured decryption shares for `∗. This can only be if W = gab and
C can give a positive answer to the SXDH challenger. Clearly, if c`∗ = 1 and c` = 0 for
all other queries to OH1 such that ` 6= `∗, the execution environment is indistinguishable
from the actual game DSµ-IND. This happens with probability Pr[c`∗ = 1 ∧ (∀` 6=
`∗ : c` = 0)] = δ(1 − δ)QH1+1, where QH1 is the number of distinct OH1 queries. By
setting δ ≈ 1QH1+1 the above probability becomes greater than
1
e·(QH1+1)
and the success
probability of the adversary can be bounded as AdvADSµ-IND ≤ e · (QH1 + 1) · AdvCSXDH.
6.2.2 Indistinguishability of the Eµ Ciphertexts
Similarly to the decryption shares, we need to prove that ciphertexts do not leak any
information about the plaintext unless, of course, there are more than t eligible users
which would lead to decryption and plaintext revelation.
To define and analyze the security of Eµ we use a straightforward adaptation of the
IND-CPA experiment (INDistinguishability under Chosen Plaintext Attack), henceforth
referred to as INDµ-BCPA (B for Bounded). The experiment requires the adversary to
declare upfront the set of users to be corrupted, similarly to selective security [36].
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Informally, in INDµ-BCPA, the adversary is given access to two hash function oracles OH1 ,
and OH2 ; the adversary can corrupt an arbitrary number nA < t− plim− 1 of pre-declared
users, and obtains their secret keys through an oracle OCorrupt. At the end of the game,
the adversary outputs a message m∗ and label `∗; the challenger flips a fair coin b, and
based on its outcome, it returns to A the encryption of either m∗ or of another random
bitstring of the same length. The adversary outputs a bit b′ and wins the game if b′ = b.
Formally, the security of Eµ is defined through the INDµ-BCPA experiment between an
adversary A and a challenger C, given a security parameter λ:
Setup Phase C executes the Eµ.Setup algorithm with λ, and generates a set of user
identities U = {Ui}n−1i=0 . Further, C gives pk to A and keeps {ski}n−1i=0 secret. At this
point, A declares the list UA of |UA| = nA < t− plim− 1 identities of users that will
later on be subject to OCorrupt calls.
Access to Oracles Throughout the game, the adversary can invoke oracles for the
hash functions H1 and H2. Additionally, the adversary can invoke the corrupt oracle
OCorrupt and receive the secret key share that corresponds to any user Ui ∈ UA.
Challenge Phase A picks the challenge message m∗ and label `∗ and sends it to C. C
chooses at random (based on a coin flip b) whether to return the encryption of m∗
i.e. Eµ.Encrypt(pk, `∗,m∗) (b = 1), or of another random string of the same length
(b = 0); let c∗ be the resulting ciphertext, which is returned to A.
Guessing Phase A outputs b′, that represents her guess for b. The adversary wins the
game, if b = b′.
The following lemma shows that INDµ-BCPA is guaranteed in Eµ as long as the SXDH
problem is intractable [35].
Lemma 6.2.2. Let H1, and H2 be random oracles. If an INDµ-BCPA adversary A has
a non-negligible advantage AdvAINDµ-BCPA := Prob[b
′ ← A(c∗) : b = b′] − 12 , then, a
probabilistic, polynomial-time algorithm C can create an environment where it uses A’s
advantage to solve any given instance of the SXDH problem.
Proof. Challenger C is given an instance 〈q′, G′1,G′2,G′T , eˆ′, g′, g¯′, A = (g′)a, B = (g′)b, C =
(g′)c, A¯ = (g¯′)a, B¯ = (g¯′)b, C¯ = (g¯′)c,W 〉 of the SXDH problem. The algorithm C simu-
lates an environment in which polynomial-time bounded adversary A operates, using its
advantage in the game INDµ-BCPA to decide whether W = eˆ (g
′, g¯′)abc. C interacts with
A within an INDµ-BCPA game:
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Setup Phase C sets q ← q′, G1 ← G′1, G2 ← G′2, GT ← G′T , eˆ = eˆ′, g ← g′, g¯ ← g¯′,
g¯pub = A¯. Notice that the secret key sk = a is not known to C. C also generates the list
of user identities U = {Ui}n−1i=0 . C sends pk = {q,G1,G2,GT eˆ,OH1 ,OH2 , g¯, g¯pub} and U
to A. A declares the list UA of nA < t − plim − 1 user identities that will later on be
subject to OCorrupt calls. Let UA = {Ui}nA−1i=0 . Next, C picks t− plim− 1 random integers
yi ←R Z∗q. Let P be a t − plim − 1 degree Lagrange polynomial implicitly defined to
satisfy P(0) = a and P(i) = yi for i = 1, .., t − plim − 1. C then sets the key-shares to
(i, ski)← yi, i ∈ [1, t− plim − 1] and assigns (i, ski) for i ∈ [1, nA] to corrupted users.
Access to Oracles C simulates oracles OH1 , OH2 and OCorrupt:
OH1 : to respond to OH1-queries, C maintains a list of tuples (v, hv, ρv, cv) as explained
below. We refer to this list as OH1 list, and it is initially empty. When A submits an
OH1 query for v, C checks if v already appears in the OH1 list in a tuple (v, hv, ρv, cv).
If so, C responds with H1(v) = hv. Otherwise, C picks ρv ←R Z∗q, and flips a coin
cv; cv flips to
′1′ with probability δ for some δ to be determined later. If cv equals
′0′, C responds H1(v) = hv = gρv and stores (v, hv, ρv, cv); otherwise, she returns
H1(v) = hv = B
ρv and stores (v, hv, ρv, cv).
OH2 : The challenger C responds to a newly submitted OH2 query for v with a randomly
chosen hv ∈ {0, 1}λ. To be consistent in her OH2 responses, C maintains the history
of her responses in her local memory.
OCorrupt: C responds to a OCorrupt query involving user Ui ∈ UA, by returning the
coordinate yi chosen in the Setup Phase.
Challenge Phase A submits m∗ and `∗ to C. Next, C runs the algorithm for re-
sponding to OH1-queries for `∗ to recover the entry from the OH1-list. Let the entry
be (`∗, h`∗ , ρ`∗ , c`∗). If c`∗ = 0, C aborts. Otherwise, C computes E∗ ← W ρ`∗ , sets
c∗ ← (m∗ ⊕ H2(E∗), C¯) and returns c∗ to A.
Guessing Phase A outputs the guess b′ for b. C provides b′ for its SXDH challenge.
If A’s answer is b′ = 1, it means that she has recognized the ciphertext c∗ as the
encryption of m∗; C can then give the positive answer to her SXDH challenge. In-
deed, W ρ`∗ = eˆ (g, g¯)abcρ`∗ = eˆ ((Bρ`∗ )a, g¯c) = eˆ
(
H1(`∗)sk, C¯
)
. Clearly, if c`∗ = 1 and
c` = 0 for all other queries to OH1 such that ` 6= `∗, then the execution environment
is indistinguishable from the actual game INDµ-BCPA. This happens with probability
Pr[c`∗ = 1 ∧ (∀` 6= `∗ : c` = 0)] = δ(1 − δ)QH1−1, where QH1 is the number of
different OH1-queries. By setting δ ≈ 1QH1+1 , the above probability becomes greater
than 1
e·(QH1+1)
, and the success probability of the adversary AdvAINDµ-BCPA is bounded as
AdvAINDµ-BCPA ≤ e · (QH1 + 1) · AdvCSXDH.
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6.3 Security Analysis of the Scheme
In chapter 4 we set the goal of our scheme to provide convergent security for popular files
and semantic security for unpopular files. We claim that the goal was reached by our
scheme under the assumptions that IRS and IdP are trusted (and thus not corruptable
by an adversary) and there are no more than nA corrupted users. In this section we
first sketch a proof of this claim and then discuss the individual assumptions and what
would happen with the security provided by the scheme in case they were violated. We
demonstrate the security properties by the “views” of each of the scheme participants and
compare the views in our scheme and in other secure deduplication proposals to show the
differences.
Note that our work systematically focuses on security only, setting the privacy aspect
aside. This is intentional since user identities are handled by IdP and the concrete im-
plementation and deployment of IdP and authentication is a complex problem orthogonal
to our main goals. To at least briefly comment on privacy, we note that in our setting,
user privacy is closely connected to user data confidentiality: it should not be possible
to link a particular file plaintext to a particular individual with better probability than
choosing that individual and file plaintext at random. Clearly, within our protocols, user
privacy is provided completely for users who own only unpopular files (this was proven in
the previous section; provided that IRS is trusted), while it is degraded for users who own
popular files. One solution for the latter case would be to incorporate anonymous and un-
linkable credentials for authentication [37, 38]. This way, a user who uploads a file to the
storage provider will not have her identity linked to the file ciphertext. On the contrary,
the file owner will be registered as one of the certified users of the system. Undoubtedly,
this would lead to a more complex IdP that would need to handle “obfuscation” of user
identities (e.g. for the billing purposes) which falls out of scope of our work. Note that
if we relax the trusted requirement of the IRS (such as we do in section 6.5) then in the
case when only IRS gets compromised, the privacy is not breached since IRS view consists
only of a set of indexes {ri} corresponding to the owners of the unpopular files, but does
not contain the actual user identities {Ui}.
6.3.1 Semantic Security of Unpopular Files
Convergent security was formally analyzed by Bellare et al. [7] and our scheme implements
classic convergent encryption for popular files. Semantic security for unpopular files is
assured by the semantically-secure cryptosystem E . What remains to show is that our
scheme does not inadvertently break the security level for unpopular files i.e. that an
adversary cannot break the security of an unpopular file without breaking the security
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assumption of trusted IdP, IRS and threshold of corruptable users.
Claim: Adversary A cannot break semantic security of any unpopular file F (i.e.
having obtained the ciphertext created by E .E he cannot extract any additional informa-
tion revealing anything about the plaintext F ) if he can only corrupt the storage provider
S and a set of users U where |U| ≤ nA.
Proof. A can obtain any unpopular file record from S (note that an intrinsic property
of unpopular files is to be associated with a single user in the storage provider database
DBS). Let the obtained record be indexed I containing data DBS[I].data = (c, cµ). Since
I was obtained by PRF using the secret seed and input unknown to A, it does not leak
any information. c was obtained using a semantically secure cryptosystem E and cµ
was obtained by cryptosystem Eµ guaranteeing INDµ-BCPA (as proved earlier), both also
guaranteeing no leakage. A cannot use corrupted users U to enforce deduplication since
|U| ≤ nA and the deduplication threshold was defined as t ≥ plim + nA and cannot
invoke deduplication in S since he does not have the required input (i.e. index mapping
and decryption shares). Having no other information conduit, A cannot break semantic
security of unpopular file F .
6.3.2 Analyzing the Consequences of Broken Assumptions
Maintaining semantic security of unpopular files even in presence of corruptable honest
but curious storage service provider S and nA corrupted users is no small feat, but requires
very strong assumptions that the adversary does not corrupt IdP, IRS and more than nA
users. To analyze the situation where an adversary could violate these assumptions, we
provide the view of all scheme entities regarding popular and unpopular files in Table 6.1.
IdP Corruption / Corrupting an Unbounded Number of Users
We start with the identity provider IdP since it’s view is the easiest to analyze. We
also demonstrate that IdP corruption and corrupting an unbounded number of users (i.e.
breaking the “no more than nA corrupted users” assumption) are equivalent in terms of
our security model.
Table 6.1: Scheme Participant Data Views
Popular File Unpopular File
IdP ∅ ∅
IRS IFc IFc , ctr, {
(
ri, dsi
)}ctr1 , {I}ctr1
S Fc, {Ui}pF1 Irnd, (c, cµ),Ui
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Regarding the actual data being stored by the storage service, the IdP observes (and
thus can provide) no information. The reason why IdP has to be trusted is thus not
directly related to the data, but to the user identities. If the adversary A is allowed to
corrupt IdP, he can exploit the user-generating process to spawn an unbounded number
of corrupted users and thus decrypt the upper (semantic security) encryption layer of any
unpopular file for which he knows the label ` = H1(Fc). The decryption is possible since
the adversary can generate t valid decryption shares
(
ri, dsi
)
with the corresponding label
` (recall that dsi ← H1
(
`
)ski). Having a set of enough decryption shares, the adversary
can invoke Eµ.Decrypt.
Depending on the IdP implementation, the adversary could also extract the master
secret skof the Eµ cryptosystem upon IdP corruption (unless the implementation stores
skin some inextractable way e.g. in a hardware security module). Notice that knowledge
of skhas exactly the same consequences as generating an unbounded number of corrupt
user identities since the adversary can skip the decryption share combination step of
Eµ.Decrypt
∏
(ri,dsi)∈St
dsi
λ
St
0,ri =
∏
(ri,ski)∈S′t
H1(`)
skiλ
St
0,ri = H1(`)
∑
(ri,ski)∈S
′
t
skiλ
St
0,ri
= H1(`)
sk
and compute H1(`)
sk directly. The rest of the decryption algorithm can run as usual.
Notice that the attack is only possible if the adversary is able to guess (or obtain from
some other source) the encryption label ` = H1(Fc). Since the label is not stored in S,
the adversary cannot choose some record of an unpopular file copy inside S (consisting of
index Irnd and ciphertext c) and force that particular file to become popular since there is
no way how to extract label ` from Irnd or from c. The adversary cannot decrypt c since
ha lacks the sufficient number of decryption shares and cannot generate them without `.
The only way for the attacker to force an unpopular file with unknown label ` to become
popular would thus be to enforce all files in the storage to become popular, which is
infeasible.
Also note that apart from the data-related information, a corruptable IdP can be seen
as a potential privacy breach since it has to validate (and thus know) the real user identity
and knows the real user identity to scheme user identity mapping. This issue is a complex
one to address and it falls out of scope of this thesis, yet there are works dedicated to this
issue countering it with pseudonymity and anonymous authentication in various scenarios
– see e.g. works by Camenisch et al. [37] or Lysyanskaya et al. [38].
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IRS Corruption
The index repository service IRS contains a lot of information for each unpopular file F
– the deduplication (convergent) index IFc , it’s mapping to the random indexes {I}ctr1
(used to index ciphertexts in S) and the corresponding decryption shares {(ri, dsi)}ctr1 .
While the random indexes do not constitute any leakage (computed via PRF) and the
decryption shares are unlinkable i.e. label is not extractable from them (see Section 6.2.1)
the remaining piece of information is vital – IFc = H1(Fc) is both the label ` used in
Eµ.Encrypt and the deduplication index I. Since H1 is collision-resistant, the attacker can
use the index to mount the same attacks as against convergent encryption thus security
of all unpopular files is degraded from semantic to convergent.
Differently from IdP corruption, the attacker knows the label ` = H1(Fc), but similarly
as in the IdP corruption case, he also cannot choose some record of an unpopular file in
S and decrypt its upper layer since he is not able to generate the necessary decryption
shares. The situation in both cases is the same, but stems from different reasons. Note
that in the case of IRS corruption, the attacker does not need the actual data contents
stored in S to mount an attack – knowledge of the index is sufficient, since there are
no collisions and thus the index always corresponds to the (correctly guessed) plaintext
(convergently-encrypted plaintext, respectively). The fact that IRS does neither store nor
ever has access to the actual data (nor their size) is vital for the strengthening measures
suggested in section 6.5, focusing on the possibility to remove the need of a trusted IRS.
6.4 Security Comparison with Other Secure Dedu-
plication Solutions
As described in chapter 3, different secure deduplication solutions often have different
goals and thus design different ways to achieve them. As we have demonstrated in our
security analysis, our scheme meets the goals we defined (i.e. semantic security for un-
popular files, convergent security for popular files, if the defined assumptions hold) and
is the only secure deduplication scheme that we know of that implicitly allows corruption
of the storage provider and up to nA users without compromising semantic security of
unpopular files. On the other hand, it undeniably also exhibits the single point of failure
(and potential leakage) vulnerability by requiring participation of a trusted IRS. Here we
compare our scheme security-wise with four other state of the art secure deduplication
schemes to demonstrate the differences.
DupLESS [5] uses a key server similar to our IRS but instead of index obfuscation,
the key server actually changes the key used for file encryption – instead of encrypting
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a file with deterministically derived convergent key kc and then obfuscating index IND,
the key kc itself is “obfuscated”. The undeniable advantage of this approach is that the
key server does not store (and never actually sees) the deduplication index nor the key kc
since the user communicates with the key server using an oblivious transfer protocol and
the key server only uses its own private secret key to obfuscate kc. Since DupLESS was
designed for target-based deduplication, it inherently counters attacks typical for conver-
gent encryption, though, for the same reason it cannot prevent the honest-but-curious
storage provider to check for file equality nor mount attacks based on the knowledge of
the deduplication index (i.e. file hash).
ClearBox [22] uses gateway G similar to DupLESS key server to achieve server-aided
key generation. G can prevent known-hash-based attacks thanks to incorporated PoW but
it cannot prevent attacks based on the known (guessed) content – a user may learn whether
a file was stored before. Interestingly, ClearBox does not consider this to be a threat in
its security model and it even implements an Attest procedure that eventually “leaks”
approximately how many users stored each file. This is caused by the different security
goals set by the ClearBox authors which prioritize undeniable deduplication estimates
over the “learn if file was stored” leakage. A suggested solution of adding high-entropy
strings to low-entropy files to counter guess-based attacks is rather tedious and requires the
user to somehow identify such low-entropy files. Our scheme offers automatic protection
against such attacks (assured by the IRS) if the popularity principle is acceptable by the
user (i.e. if the user agrees that the property may be lost in case more than t − 1 other
users also upload the same file). One more slight difference between our scheme and
DupLESS compared to ClearBox is that G actually has access to the encrypted files (and
thus knows also some additional properties such as the file size).
Liu et al. [23] present a scheme that does not require the trusted component in form
of IRS, G or a key server and instead delegates the trust among the individual users
of the system. The server component itself participates only minimally in the actual
process of deduplication, most of the “sensitive” computation is done by the users. While
the “user-trust-based” approach is definitely interesting, the presented scheme cannot
prevent an honest but curious storage provider S to check for file equality and is prone
to user collusion attacks. Our scheme prevents the user collusion attacks by introducing
a concrete bounded limit for the number of corrupted users.
ClouDedup [21] isolates the storage provider from the deduplication procedure com-
pletely, not leaking any information. However, to achieve such a perfect isolation ClouD-
edup introduces two quite complex trusted components. The security setting of ClouD-
edup is more suitable for corporate-like environments where the “private network” with
users can redirect data through the introduced trusted component(s) to enable their se-
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cure storage in some “outside” cloud storage provider. Our scenario is slightly different
and our trusted components a bit more “lightweight” whereas ClouDedup is undeniably
better suited for actual practical deployment. Security-wise the general approach in both
solutions is quite similar – layered encryption, eliminating known-hash-based attacks and
prioritizing data confidentiality over other goals.
6.5 Relaxing the Requirement of the Trusted IRS
While our scheme does reach its goal, the requirement of two trusted components, IRS
and IdP, is a very strong one. While a trusted IdP is quite common, since practically
every system and network has to have some identity provider and management, a trusted
IRS is not so common. Moreover, the fact that the IRS knows all the deduplication
indexes and decryption shares and can thus bruteforce the deduplication index to gain
some information about the stored data content (confirmation of file attacks and learn the
remaining information attacks typical for convergent encryption) makes it very powerful
and a potential viable target for an attack. Since transferring the ideal trusted third
party model to real world is not that easy, we discuss the possibility how to make IRS
potentially corruptable without (entirely) sacrificing the “better security assurance” for
unpopular data.
In section 3.1.2 we have described the weak point of deduplication – the deduplication
index. Knowledge of the index gives the ability to compare data contents with some
other data contents and find out if they match, even if they are convergently encrypted.
Since our lower layer of encryption is convergent and we need to know which unpopular
files have the same content, the deduplication index has to be stored somewhere. Our
original security model considers an honest but curious (HBC) storage provider S, up to
nA corrupted users and a trusted IRS. If we modify the model to allow IRS to be honest
but curious (same as S), security of unpopular files will be automatically degraded to
convergent (see section 6.3).
For deduplication to work in our scheme, the deduplication index has to be known to
some of the scheme participants i.e. to IdP, IRS, S or users. IdP is out of scope, as it is
included only to manage user identities and not to participate in the scheme otherwise.
Splitting the information among users owning files with the same index would require
notable redesign of the whole scheme and users to stay online most of the time, which
we want to avoid. If such a requirement is acceptable, we recommend the work of Liu et
al. [23], where a secure deduplication model based on this principle is described. That
leaves two possibilities – IRS, where the index is stored in the current scheme, and S.
Setting S as trusted does not make practical sense – if S were trusted, the proposed
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complex deduplication scheme would not be required at all. This creates a seemingly
impossible situation – IRS must store the index, yet we wish to make it corruptible.
To move further, we need to analyze the deduplication index weakness in the specific
case of our scheme in more detail. For this we use the “confirmation of a file” attack
scenario – the attacker who knows, or can guess, content of a file can use the index to
find out if the file was already uploaded by someone else. Consulting the IRS view (see
Table 6.1) this can be devised by computing the index of the known file and checking that
a record in IRS indexed by this index exists. If so, the file was already stored. If there
are any associated decryption shares, the attacker can be “near-sure” that i) the file was
uploaded by ctr users and ii) is unpopular. The attacker can be “near-sure” since the
indexing function is collision resistant and thus a chance that one index will be associated
with more different files is extremely low. Note that if there are no shares associated with
the index but ctr is non-zero, the attacker can be sure that the file was also uploaded and
is popular (since deduplication already correctly happened).
Thus, even though the attacker that compromises IRS does not have access to the
ciphertext (and even if he had access, the ciphertext is encrypted using semantically secure
encryption and thus not decryptable unless t valid shares were already collected), our
scheme is still prone to a “confirmation of file” attack if IRS is corrupted since IRS provides
a “near-sure” confirmation of the file presence. Using this knowledge, we aim at modifying
our scheme to achieve a situation where the “near-sure” confirmation will be removed,
thus the attacker wouldn’t be able to prove his guess and the security model would allow
a corruptable IRS. In the rest of this section we analyze two possible relaxations of the
trusted IRS requirement – a “weaker” one where the attacker may compromise either S
or IRS, but not both, and a “stronger” one, where he can corrupt both. We note upfront
that the sketched modified scheme proposals are by far not as simple and efficient as
our original scheme, which is why we decided not to implement them in our core scheme
proposal.
6.5.1 Adversary Can Corrupt either IRS or S
Let us first consider a security model where the attacker can corrupt up to nA users and can
corrupt either S or IRS, but not both. Thanks to the fact that the attacker cannot corrupt
both IRS and S in this new model, we can decide not to store the deduplication index in
any one of them, but to split it among them instead. Indeed, this constitutes a potential
leakage of information about file contents inside S, which was fully prevented in the
original setting, but it allows to lift the strong requirement for incorruptible IRS, replacing
it by a weaker “either S or IRS can be corrupted” notion. Undoubtedly, corrupting two
separate systems that have different implementation, can be placed in different places and
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protected by different mechanisms is a much more complex task than finding a weakness
in one target system. Additionally, the scheme modification sketched in this section is
very versatile and allows to vary the degree of information leakage obtainable for both S
and IRS in this new setting. The typical attacks against deduplication systems, such as
the “confirmation of a file” attack scenario thus can be mitigated (up to some predefined
degree of acceptable probability).
To modify our scheme to fit the new model, we need to implement the following:
Index splitting To be able to split the deduplication index into parts, one to store inside
IRS and one inside S. It is not necessary to split the index into equal halves and
it is also possible to split it to more than two parts (even though just two will be
shared). This can be configured depending on the size of the index and acceptable
leakage in the IRS and S.
Deduplicability feedback function Since the IRS newly stores only a part of the in-
dex, the decryption shares indexed with this part can correspond to different files.
Thus, there has to be a deduplicability feedback function through which the IRS
could ask S whether the set of random indexes likely corresponds to the same file
(and thus it makes sense to try deduplication) or not.
Deduplication result Once a file is successfully deduplicated, the S has to notify the
IRS, providing the whole IFc (since it is unknown to IRS).
Popular file list Since the user cannot use the whole IFc when checking if a file is
popular (since that would leak IFc to IRS, which is not desired) there has to be
a list of popular files published (and updated) by the IRS. We denote the list as
PLIST.
Since the new approach requires the user to split IFc and not to share the whole index
with either IRS or S until the user is sure that the file is already popular (otherwise the
split of the index to parts wouldn’t really make sense), we introduce a new mechanism to
the scheme – the popular file list PLIST. The list is maintained and published by the IRS.
A new deduplication index of a file is added to the list once IRS invokes the Deduplicate
algorithm and obtains a success result for it. The user is responsible to download (or
update, if he already downloaded a previous version) the popular file list as a first step
when invoking Upload. Since the list of popular files is publicly available in this modified
scheme, it is highly recommended to add also a Proof of Ownership (PoW) mechanism
to protect against the covert file distribution attack. The PoW should be added to a
deduplicable Put request algorithm.
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Ui: kc ← Ec.K(F )
Fc ← Ec.E(kc, F )
IFc ← I(Fc)
Ui −→ IRS: PLIST← current PLIST
Ui: if(IFc ∈ PLIST)
Ui −→ S: Put(IFc ,Ui, Fc)
Ui: F ← (kc, IFc)
else
IFc|1IFc|2 ← IFc
(ri, dsi)← Eµ.DShare(ri, ski, Fc)
Ui −→ IRS: Iret ← GenSecIdx(IFc|1 , (ri, dsi))
Ui: k ← E .K();
c← E .E(k, Fc)
cµ ← Eµ.Encrypt(pk, Fc, k)
F ′ ← (c, cµ, IFc|2)
Ui −→ S: Put(Iret,Ui, F ′)
Ui: F ← (k, Iret, kc, IFc)
Figure 6.1: Modified Upload(F,Ui) algorithm. Popular file upload part is highlighted in
green (lighter color), unpopular file upload part in blue (darker color).
To implement the index-splitting, we modify our scheme as follows: The convergent
index IFc that is computed during the Upload algorithm is split to two parts IFc− >
IFc|1 , IFc|2 . Only the first part IFc|1 is being sent to the IRS as part of the GenSecIdx
algorithm. The second part IFc|2 is stored locally and only in case that actual data
upload is required (file not yet popular) the second part IFc|2 is attached to the data
that is being uploaded to S. We present the modified version of the Upload algorithm
in Figure 6.1. We define a new parameter dedidx in the S record (i.e. for an S record
indexed by idx we define DBS[idx].dedidx) to store the IFc|2 . Note that if there is a
requirement on higher level of “uncertainty” for the potential attacker, the index could
be split into three parts and the third parts kept local, not shared with IRS nor with S.
Note that this additional strengthening measure comes with a cost of (potentially many)
more deduplicability feedback requests.
When a GenSecIdx request that would cause invocation of Deduplicate in the original
scheme arrives at IRS, IRS invokes the deduplicability feedback function Deduplicable in-
stead. Deduplicable is defined in Figure 6.2. The purpose of Deduplicable is to find out if
all the “random indexes” indexed by the same IFc|1 inside IRS correspond to the same file
or not. S can answer this question since it stores IFc|2 in the records indexed by the “ran-
dom indexes” provided as parameters in Deduplicable – if there are at least t same IFc|2 in
the checked records, the corresponding records do belong to the same file and thus can be
deduplicated. In such a case S returns True and a set of indexes having the same IFc|2 .
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S: Darr← [0, 0, .., 0]; Rarr← [∅, ∅, .., ∅]; i← 1
foreach(I ∈ idxes)
if(∃j : DBS[I].dedidx = Darr[j]))
Rarr[j]← Rarr[j] ∪ I
else
Darr[i] = DBS[I].dedidx; Rarr[i]← Rarr[i] ∪ I; i← i+ 1
if(∃j : |Rarr[j]| ≥ t))
return (True; Rarr[j])
else
return (False; ∅)
Figure 6.2: The Deduplicable(idxes) algorithm. For a set of indexes of records inside S
returns if at least t of the records do contain the same IFc|2 value. If yes, it returns a list
of such indexes.
If there is no set of records of size at least t that would share the same IFc|2 , Deduplicable
returns False and IRS would need to re-try later, when there are more candidates in its
respective record. The GenSecIdx function has to be modified to account for these re-tries
and a new parameter needs to be introduced to specify when the re-try should occur. A
reasonable option might be to retry every time the counter reaches a multiplied value of
threshold t (e.g. 2t, 3t etc.) – in this case we don’t even need to specify a new parameter
and can modify the GenSecIdx as shown in Figure 6.3.
Providing a deduplication result in the form of IFc from S to IRS after a successful
deduplication (such that IRS can update and publish the popular file list) is the last
required modification. This can be easily achieved by adding return IFc at the very end
of the Deduplicate algorithm from the original scheme.
Analysing the proposed modified scheme, we can see that the actual security properties
IRS: Irnd ← PRF(σ,Ui||IFc|1)
if (Irnd /∈ DBIRS
[
IFc|1
]
.idxes)
increment DBIRS
[
IFc|1
]
.ctr
add Irnd to DBIRS
[
IFc|1
]
.idxes
add (ri, dsi) to DBIRS
[
IFc|1
]
.dshares
if (DBIRS
[
IFc|1
]
.ctr = mt; m ∈ N)
IRS −→ S: ret ← Deduplicable(DBIRS
[
IFc|1
]
.idxes)
if(ret = (True; retidxes))
IRS −→ S: IFc ← Deduplicate(DBIRS
[
IFc|1
]
.retidxes, DBIRS
[
IFc|1
]
.dshares)
IRS: PLIST = PLIST ∪ IFc
Figure 6.3: Modified GenSecIdx(IFc|1 , (ri, dsi)) algorithm. There is no green part related
to popular file since popular files are directly uploaded to S once found in PLIST. The red
part related to deduplication is extended to account for the new Deduplicable algorithm.
CHAPTER 6. SECURITY ANALYSIS 55
highly depend on the specific setup and dataset. Considering an index size |IFc | = κ, if
we decide to split it such that |IFc|1| = κ − 1 and |IFc|2| = 1 then the “uncertainty” of
the attacker that corrupted IRS when trying to guess if file F was uploaded is minimal
since κ is chosen high enough to allow for collision-resistant I, thus possible “hit” still
means the attacker can be near-sure the file was uploaded (the probability that someone
uploaded file F2 whose hash would match that of the guessed file F but for the last bit is
very low). If we decide to split the index in equal halves (i.e. |IFc|1| = |IFc|2| = κ/2), then
the “uncertainty” for an attacker that corrupted IRS is substantially higher – considering
a guess of file F and computing index IFc , the attacker can check if there is any record for
IFc|1 . However, if there is, it can either correspond to F or to any other uploaded file whose
index has the same IFc|1 (i.e. there are 2κ/2 other options). Note that the “uncertainty”
of the attacker that corrupted S is the same in this respect since he can theoretically check
the values of all records, comparing the IFc|2 . If this level of uncertainty is not acceptable,
it is possible to split the index to three parts and increase size of IFc|3 (thus decrease
size of |IFc|1 | and |IFc|2|) to a required level. Note though that such behavior inherently
decreases efficiency of the scheme as the number of Deduplicable and failed Deduplicate
requests would notably increase.
6.5.2 Adversary Can Corrupt both IRS and S
The previously described modification where the adversary can corrupt either IRS or S
for the cost of performance decrease does not completely solve the limitation posed by
the requirement of a trusted third party since either IRS or S has to be trusted (i.e. not
corrupted by the same attacker). Here we try to eliminate the trusted party completely
(apart from IdP, as discussed earlier). In our new security model we postulate that the
attacker can corrupt up to nA users and both S and IRS are honest but curious. Note
that this new security model allows the attacker to corrupt both IRS and S thus it is
not possible to split the index between them as the attacker could simply “reassemble” it
using the information he gets from IRS and S.
Considering the situation, the only possible approach that we identified is to sacrifice
the part of the index shared with S. The scheme would look exactly as in the modification
proposed in Section 6.5.1 but will not share IFc|2 with S (i.e. there will be no IFc|2 inside
the S records, the S records are exactly the same as in the unmodified scheme presented
in Section 5). This also influences Deduplicable, which cannot be implemented. Thus,
instead of invoking Deduplicable as defined in the modification in Section 6.5.1, we would
always need to invoke Deduplicate and S would need to try all the possibilities.
Note that if there are more than t deduplication shares during deduplication compu-
tation, the only way to successfully deduplicate is to try (in the worst case all) possible
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combinations. Having t + x decryption shares in the Deduplicate request, this means(
t+x
t
)
combinations of decryption shares where for each combination the shares have to
be combined (H1(`)
sk) and file contents have to be decrypted and compared. It is easy to
see that for higher values of x this quickly becomes computationally infeasible, thus the
“uncertainty” of the attacker has to be kept relatively small (to make that Deduplicate
will have high probability to succeed for reasonable values of x).
Due to the described complexity, this modification is quite impractical and serves more
as a theoretical concept than a useful proposal. Finding a better solution that would allow
to have both IRS and S corruptible is an open problem.
In our proposed modifications we have noted “performance degradation” due to various
factors. To get a better idea about how to compute and measure performance of the
scheme in general (and therefore also how big the described performance degradations
may be) kindly refer to chapter 7.
Chapter 7
Performance Evaluation
Our scheme was designed to provide more fine-grained trade-off between security and
space efficiency compared to the “classic” deduplication scheme exploiting convergent en-
cryption [3]. Specifically, deduplication efficiency is decreased for the benefit of increased
security of unpopular files. This section presents both theoretical equations and practical
measurements to demonstrate scheme performance and efficiency both in terms of space
reduction and in computation and communication cost. We compare the results to those
of classic deduplication and to other secure data deduplication solutions.
First, we modify the deduplication ratio (DR) definition, used for classic deduplication
efficiency evaluation, to formulate a space reduction ratio (SRR) that can be used to
easily compare the efficiency of our scheme to that of classic deduplication, using the
dataset properties only, without the need to apply deduplication to the dataset. Next, we
present evaluation of the SRR efficiency of our scheme on artificial and real datasets, to
demonstrate which factors influence it, and how. Second, we focus on resources required
by the scheme in terms of computation and communication split between the individual
algorithms and their phases. Additionally, we comment on the expected user-perceived
delay, comparing to storage services without deduplication or with classic convergently
secured deduplication.
7.1 Storage Space Reduction Ratio
A classic deduplication scheme uses a simple metric called deduplication (or duplicity) ratio
(DR) to evaluate the space-saving efficiency of deduplication applied to a concrete dataset.
Deduplication ratio is defined as “size of dataset before deduplication” divided by “size
of dataset after deduplication” or, in a simpler way, as DR = bytes in/bytes out [2]. Tech-
nically, deduplication ratio is applicable to every deduplication scheme (ours included),
however it is necessary to first deduplicate the whole dataset. To prevent this necessity
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of the actual dataset deduplication process (which can be quite resource-intensive), we
present the Space Reduction Ratio (SRR) that can be used to compute deduplication ef-
ficiency based solely on known properties of the individual dataset files. Specifically, for
each unique file F in the dataset we only need to know its size |F| and its popularity pF
(i.e. in how many copies it is present in the dataset).
Having a dataset described using unique files, their sizes and popularities, a clas-
sic deduplication scheme removes all excessive copies of a unique file, keeping only one.
Therefore we denote classic deduplication as perfect deduplication for which it holds that
a per-file space reduction ratio for file F is equal to its popularity pF (since the non-
deduped size pF × |F | is reduced to |F | by deduplication). For our scheme, the space
reduction occurs only for popular files i.e. files where pF ≥ t, whereas there is no space
reduction for unpopular files (reminder from Section 4.3, t ≥ plim + nA). The concrete
deduplication efficiency of our scheme thus depends directly on two factors – the threshold
t (tunable parameter of the scheme) and the popularity distribution of files in the dataset
(determined by the dataset, non-settable).
To define formally, having a dataset F = {Fi}Ni=1 where file Fi has popularity pFi , the
SRR of a perfect deduplication scheme is SRR =
∑N
i=1(|Fi| × pFi)/
∑N
i=1 |Fi|. To compute
the SRR for our scheme, we have to choose t and split the dataset into a set of popular
files Fp = {Fi |pFi ≥ t} and a set of unpopular files Fu = {Fi |pFi < t}. The space
reduction ratio SRR is then computed as:
SRR =
N∑
i=1
(|Fi| × pFi)/(
∑
F∈Fp
|F |+
∑
F∈Fu
(|F | × pF ))
For simpler comparison (to directly see how much space was saved, percentually) we define
the space reduction percentage SRP as
SRP = (1− 1/SRR)× 100
Note that SRR = 1 (SRP = 0) means no deduplication occurs (zero efficiency).
Note that same as DR, SRR is computed over the actual file contents only, not counting
associated metadata (such as when the file was accessed, modified etc.). For deduplication
to be efficient, it is expected that metadata are marginal in size compared to actual file
contents. Since our scheme generates some additional metadata that are not being counted
by the SRR, we also address the metadata overhead later in this section and show that it
is likewise marginal to the actual file contents size.
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7.2 Analysis of Space Reduction Efficiency
As described, the space reduction efficiency of our scheme is directly dependent on two
factors – the threshold t and the popularity distribution of files in the dataset. We first
present an analysis of space reduction efficiency of our scheme using simple artificial
distributions to demonstrate the influence of choice of threshold t and then perform the
analysis using two real-world datasets, to show the influence in practice.
7.2.1 Artificial Datasets
To demonstrate the influence of the factors on storage space efficiency of the scheme
without concrete data we use artificial datasets with files of uniform size |F | = 1. This
simplifies the SRR equation to
SRR =
N∑
i=1
(pFi)/(
∑
F∈Fp
1 +
∑
F∈Fu
(pF ))
First we use a very basic example where popularity is constant i.e. for every file F
in the dataset, the popularity pF = c, where c is a natural number greater than zero (we
deliberately prevent a dataset without duplicates). With constant popularity, the SRR
can be easily computed, based on the value of t as:
1. t ≤ c perfect deduplication (maximum efficiency) is achieved since all files are
popular i.e. Fu = ∅ thus
SRR =
N∑
i=1
(pFi)/(
∑
F∈Fp
1) = pF
2. t > c no deduplication (zero efficiency) is achieved since all files are unpopular i.e.
Fp = ∅ thus
SRR =
N∑
i=1
(pFi)/(0 +
∑
F∈Fu
(pF )) = 1
The constant-popularity example clearly shows the basic limits but does not demonstrate
the gradual changes of SRR. To show these we use a uniform distribution.
Using a discrete uniform distribution as the dataset popularity distribution nicely
demonstrates the influence of step-by-step increasing t on the SRR. Considering a discrete
uniform distribution with lower bound a and upper bound b described with a probability
mass function as f(x) = 1/n for x ∈ 〈a, b〉 and n = b− a+ 1 (i.e. having a set of discrete
values a, a + 1, .. , b − 1, b that are equally likely to be observed), the efficiency of the
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proposed scheme based on the value of t can be expressed as:
1. t ≤ a, perfect deduplication (maximum efficiency) is achieved since all files are
popular i.e. Fu = ∅ and thus
SRR =
N∑
i=1
(pFi)/(
∑
F∈Fp
1) = pF
2. a < t ≤ b, less efficient than perfect deduplication is achieved since files with
popularity lower than t are popular and those with popularity higher or equal to t
are not and thus the general equation must be used
SRR =
N∑
i=1
(pFi)/(
∑
F∈Fp
1 +
∑
F∈Fu
(pF ))
3. t > b, no deduplication (zero efficiency) is achieved since all files are unpopular i.e.
Fp = ∅ and thus
SRR =
N∑
i=1
(pFi)/(0 +
∑
F∈Fu
(pF )) = 1
For better illustration how the SRR changes let us use a simple example of a storage
containing 5 base files with popularity distribution Unif(2, 6) so 20 files in total. SRR of
perfect deduplication in this example is 4, SRR and SRP values of our scheme for different
values of t are listed in Tab. 7.1 along with number of files remaining in the dataset after
deduplication. Note that the number of files remaining in the dataset after deduplication
does not increase linearly with increasing t, but grows faster with higher t. Based on
this observation, using our scheme with a dataset containing a few files with very high
popularity (pF >> t) and many files with very low popularity (pF << t) could still have
reasonable deduplication efficiency.
Table 7.1: Scheme Efficiency for Discrete Uniform Popularity Distribution, Unif(2, 6), 20
Files
t SRR SRP files after dedup.
2 4.00 (4:1) 75 5
3 3.34 (10:3) 70 6
4 2.50 (5:2) 60 8
5 1.82 (20:11) 45 11
6 1.34 (4:3) 25 15
7 1.00 (1:1) 0 20
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Figure 7.1: Graphical example: Deduplication over dataset with Pareto popularity distri-
bution. Values for t=5, t=10 and t=20 are emphasized. Values for larger data sets and t
values are in Table 7.3.
While it is generally impossible to model popularity distribution with a clean sim-
ple function-based distribution, analyses of different empirical data show that power-law
distributions appear in most of the human-generated and human-managed data from dif-
ferent areas [9]. Based on these observations, we used Matlab to analyze the efficiency
of the proposed scheme for a power-law popularity distribution. We used the generalized
Pareto distribution with all parameters (i.e. shape, scale and threshold) equal to 1 as an
illustrative example. First we generated a random vector ~x of length 100, sampling the
chosen distribution. The impact of various choices of t in one generated example is illus-
trated in Fig. 7.1. Note that the concrete numbers will differ per every new measurement
since the filesize distribution is obtained by finite sampling from an infinite distribution,
with an infinite expected value. To smoothen the results, we repeated the experiment
100 times and computed the arithmetic averages that are presented in Tab 7.2. It is
important to take these results as basis for general implications about their relation and
dependency instead of considering them to be “hard numbers”. To demonstrate how the
situation scales up from the very small dataset, we varied the vector length and t values,
average results over 100 samples are available in Tab. 7.3.
The above illustrative examples demonstrate how threshold t and the file popularity
distribution in the dataset influence the resulting efficiency of the scheme (not very good
in either case). Indeed, if the datasets really did have constant popularity per file, or
uniform or Pareto distributions, our scheme would not be a very good fit for them. Note
that we specifically stressed this in the scheme overview section 4, stating that “outsourced
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Table 7.2: Average SRR for Generalized Pareto Popularity Distribution, 100 Experiments,
Dataset with 100 Files
t Our Scheme Perfect Deduplication
5 5.9
9.910 4.3
20 3.4
dataset contains few instances of some data items and many instances of others”. Neither
of the classic distributions used so far satisfy this requirement, yet they were useful to
demonstrate the interdependence of factors, specifically the threshold t, file popularity pF
and its distribution, all influencing efficiency of our our scheme. In the rest of this section
we focus our analysis on real-world examples and discuss scheme efficiency for them.
7.2.2 Real Datasets
To analyse the efficiency of our scheme on real data we use two publicly available datasets
– the PB dataset comprised of data collected by F. Hecht, T. Bocek and D. Hausheer
from the popular BitTorrent tracker Pirate Bay [39], representing an example of user
data backup from multiple users, and the UPC dataset, similar to the one used by Liu
et al. [23], consisting of data provided by the Ubuntu Popularity Contest [40] (snapshot
taken on March 15, 2016) and representing an example of a system hard drive backup
from multiple users.
The PB dataset is a collection composed mostly of audio, video and software. Since
no information about torrent contents (i.e. file-level granularity) is provided, we consider
each torrent to correspond to one file for the purpose of our measurement (note that this
simplification does not positively impact the results – on the contrary, the savings would
only be better in case some file was shared among the different torrents). This way, we
obtain 679 515 unique files of size ranging from 0 to 224 GB. To compute popularity of
each of these files we sum the number of “seeders” i.e. peers already having the whole file
Table 7.3: Average SRR for Generalized Pareto Popularity Distribution, 100 Samples
t
Number of files
10 000 1 000 000
Our Scheme
20 6.24 5.52
50 4.78 4.24
100 4.08 3.6
Perfect ded. 18.6 16.46
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Figure 7.2: File popularity distributions in the evaluated datasets, logarithmic scale.
and “leechers” i.e. peers having only part of the file at the moment, but intending to get
the whole file in near future. File popularity ranges between 0 and 124 975. We remove
files with zero size or zero popularity (inactive torrents), getting a dataset consisting of
442 332 unique files with popularity ranging from 1 to 124 975. The dataset contains
10 836 260 files in total (including duplicates) and has total size of 23,149 petabytes.
The UPC dataset represents a collection of Ubuntu software packages including the
information about how many users downloaded and installed each package. Using the list
provided by the Ubuntu Popularity Contest[40] and the apt-cache command on a Ubuntu
15.10 x86 64 machine, we extract sizes of the packages ranging from 736 B to 1.01 GB,
omitting unavailable packages. This way we obtain a dataset consisting of 46 040 unique
files with popularity ranging from 1 to 2 755 245. There are 3 641 060 666 files in total in
the dataset, with the total size of 2,282 petabytes.
Popularity distributions of both datasets are shown in Figure 7.2. To compare the
efficiency of our scheme to perfect deduplication, we provide SRP comparison for both
datasets in Figure 7.3.
As the SRPs demonstrate, our scheme offers very good reduction for the UPC dataset,
even for quite high values of threshold t (99,68% reduction for t = 1 000) whereas for
the PB dataset efficiency decreases faster and the reduction capabilities for high values
of threshold t are much lower (26% reduction for t = 1 000). The difference in scheme
efficiency in the two evaluated datasets is caused by the difference in their popularity
distribution. Even though both datasets have the total size in the order of petabytes, the
PB dataset contains only two files with popularity larger than 100 000 whereas the UPC
dataset contains 3267 such files. Note that the higher the popularity of a file, the better
the reduction by its deduplication.
Using the results of the analysis of the two datasets, we postulate the following obser-
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Figure 7.3: Space reduction percentage (SRP) comparison of our scheme and perfect
deduplication schemes for the PB dataset and the UPC dataset.
vations regarding efficiency of our scheme:
1. for datasets containing many files with very high popularity (such as the UPC
dataset) the efficiency is very good even for quite high values of t;
2. for datasets having the popularity distribution close to a power-law distribution
(such as the PB dataset) the efficiency is notably worse compared to perfect dedu-
plication for very high values of t, but a compromise between security and efficiency
can be found for reasonable values of t (e.g. SRP = 67,95 for t = 100 in the PB
dataset);
3. for datasets having steep long-tailed popularity distribution (i.e. many files with
low popularities, only a few files with high popularity) the efficiency of our scheme
is poor and it should not be used for such datasets.
These observations fit well with the original goal of targeting outsourced datasets contain-
ing few instances of some data items and many instances of others.
7.3 Metadata Overhead Analysis
As described in the SRR definition (Section 7.1), this metric works over file contents
only, ignoring metadata as insignificant and marginal in size. To make sure our scheme
does not introduce any new metdata of significant size, we do a metadata size analysis,
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Popular File Unpopular File
user’s local storage |index|+ |key| 2× (|index|+ |key|)
IRS storage |index|+ |ctr| (pF + 1)× |index|+
pF × |dshare|+ |ctr|
Table 7.4: General metadata overhead analysis.
providing equations to compute metadata size and evaluate its respective concrete sizes
for the real-world UPC and PB datasets.
In our scheme, metadata are stored in the users local storage and in the IRS storage
only. Table 7.4 summarizes the equations to compute a per-file metadata overhead for
both users local storage and for IRS storage. Note that we do not consider the metadata
stored in the storage providers space S (specifically information about owners and dedu-
plication index required by our scheme) since these have to be an integral part of the
storage provider file metadata anyway, independent on whether or not a deduplication
scheme is used.
To evaluate the metadata overhead concretely we can use the datasets from Section 7.2
and set λ = 128 (thus |key| is 8 bytes), index size |index| to 32 bytes, popularity counter
size |ctr| to 2 bytes and |dshare| size to 64 bytes (all settings that we actually use for
practical measurements analysis later). Considering the highest measured value t = 1 000
to obtain the highest unpopular to popular file ratio (and thus the highet metadata
overhead), we computed the metadata overheads listed in Table 7.5.
Note that metadata overhead is independent on the actual file size, though for very
small files the overhead could still be seen as significant. From the user’s perspective,
for deduplication to make sense the file must be larger than 80 bytes (size of metadata
needed to be stored locally per unpopular files, not affected by the value of t). From the
IRS perspective, the metadata size is highly influenced by the value of t – unpopular files
with the highest popularity take up the most space having to store the index mappings and
decryption shares. For the considered highest value of t = 1000 we can take a worst-case
example file with popularity pF = 999 causing corresponding IRS metadata to be almost
96 kB. Thankfully, due to the nature of dataset popularity distribution and the fact that
also huge part of the metadata-taken space is reclaimed when the file gets popular, the
Table 7.5: Metadata overhead analysis for the PB and UPC datasets (in MB).
PB dataset UPC dataset
user’s local storage 25,86 2,94
IRS storage 803,12 503,71
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IRS metadata also remains insignificant in case of the PB and DPC datasets 7.5.
7.4 Computation and Communication Cost Analysis
In this section we analyse the computation and communication cost of our scheme, by
dissecting scheme algorithms to individual components and analyzing their cost based
on parameter variables. For practical measurements, we implement a prototype of our
scheme and measure the respective components. Knowledge from this section can be
used to evaluate computation and communication cost of our scheme for any dataset.
Finally we provide comparative measurements of our prototype to implementations of
other secure deduplication solutions.
7.4.1 Analysis Setup
To measure consumption of computational and communication resources in practice and
provide comparison to other schemes, we implement a prototype of our scheme consisting
of a client program that performs file upload and download operations, a server IdP
program that sets up the system parameters and user share generation, a helper server
deduplication application and an IRS that creates secure connection (TLS) with the user
and generates secure indexes. For comparison with other schemes, we use the publicly
available prototype of DupLESS [5], a prototype kindly provided by Liu et al. [23] and our
prototype implementation of ClearBox [22] (authors could not provide their code due to
company policies). The Attest procedure of ClearBox was not implemented as neither of
the other solutions provides such functionality. To eliminate measurement discrepancies
caused by implementation, we prototyped our scheme and ClearBox mostly in Python
using DupLESS code as basis, and used the Crypto and hashlib Python libraries for
symmetric cryptography operations and hashing, and a wrapper for the C-implemented
PBC library [34] for pairing-based cryptography operations. The prototype by Liu et al. is
implemented in Javascript and we used it “as is” with one modification – to be comparable
with others, instead of storing files locally at the server, the server uses Dropbox for the
actual file storage and internally stores only a hash of the file for comparison purposes.
To prevent confusion, we use the term “client” for the client-side application, “server” for
the server-side application (i.e. our IRS, gateway in ClearBox, KS in DupLESS, S in the
scheme of Liu et al.) and Dropbox as the cloud storage backend. All implementations
were tested on an Intel Xeon E3-1220 machine with 4 CPU cores 3.1 GHz, and 16GB of
RAM running Ubuntu 14.04.
To keep prototypes as aligned as possible we set the general bit-security to 128 – we use
AES-128-CTR as symmetric encryption, SHA256 for hashing and type F bilinear pairing
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provided by the PBC library [34] for group operations, where applicable. Note that if
bit-security 256 or larger is required, we recommend to use newer curves introduced by
Aranha et al. [41] since the PBC library tends to get rather slow for such settings. Our
scheme specific settings include the bitsize of the order of the exploited groups |q| = 256
and threshold t = 1 000. We use SHA-256 as the indexing function and also whenever
hash functions are needed.
To emulate WAN network delay (since we only use one testing server), we use the
tc Linux command shaping all traffic using a Pareto distribution with mean 20 ms and
variance of 4 ms, same as Armknecht et al. [22].
7.4.2 Network Communication
Network communication consists of relations between the scheme participants. We split
and sort the individual data transfers by scheme algorithms in Table 7.6. Note that GetIdx
is part of each Upload (i.e. Upload.Unpopular and Upload.Popular).
Considering that scheme deployment only makes sense in cases where actual data
contents are much larger than the corresponding metadata (see Section 7.3), we observe
that most of the bandwidth is consumed by transfer of the actual encrypted file contents
i.e. the unpopular file upload and (both popular and unpopular) file download operations
between user and S. Compared to |file|, all other sizes are marginal.
Note that while the interaction between user and IRS consists of very small messages,
it occurs quite frequently and, moreover, it must be secure (at least in the “user to IRS”
direction) for the scheme security properties to hold. Implementation-wise this could
impose additional communication cost (e.g. the TLS handshake) and we recommend that
the client application should create batch requests or use the same secure connection for
more requests to reduce this unaccounted-for communication cost.
7.4.3 Computational Resources
Consumption of computational resources is split among the scheme participants as follows:
IdP performs computation during scheme initialization and upon new user credentials
generation
IRS computes a pseudorandom function (PRF) per each first “unique” request (unique
combination of user identity and deduplication index; the index is the input to the
PRF)
S uses most computational resources during the actual file deduplication process
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Table 7.6: Data Transfers per Scheme Algorithm
Algorithm From To Payload Size
GetIdx (Upload)
user IRS |index|+ |dshare|
IRS user |index|
Upload.Unpopular user S |index|+ |file|
Upload.Popular user S |index|
Download
user S |index|
S user |boolean|+ |file|
Delete
user S |index|
S user |index|
user IRS |index|+ |ri|
S IRS |index| or 0
Deduplicate IRS S t× (|dshare|+ |index|)
user Ui spends most computational resources during encryption and decryption of data
All participants are required also to do some database lookups but these are implementation-
specific and should be quite fast and simple, thus we do not include them in our analysis.
Since the PRF computation is always performed over a short hash only, the processing
cost is negligible. Therefore, we focus on the more interesting Init, Upload, Download and
Deduplicate algorithms in more detail.
Init
We evaluate the time required to initialize the scheme using the Eµ.Setup implementation
consisting of two logically independent processes – “scheme parameters generation and
initialization” and “user share generation”.
The first process includes the generation of {G1,G2,GT , eˆ, g, g¯, g¯pub} and of the secret
sk. Using the PBC library for pairing implementation, most of the time consumed by
Eµ.Setup is taken by the process of pairing parameter generation (i.e. finding suitable
groups and pairing based on the value of the security parameter λ). The results for varied
values of the security parameter λ are available in Table 7.7, value of threshold t plays no
role in this phase. Note that the scheme initialization cost is very low compared to the
parameters generation cost.
The second process implements secret user-share generation in the most straightfor-
ward way – master secret sk is the zeroth coefficient in a polynomial of order t, user share
is generated by polynomial evaluation using the Horner scheme. The number of users
is practically unlimited, a new secret share can be generated anytime by evaluating the
polynomial at the next point (if the last shared secret was evaluated at n, the next one
would be evaluated at n+ 1 etc.). Depending on the t value, the generation process takes
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from 3 ns for t = 50 to 1.04 ms for t = 1000. These values are negligible compared to
other measured processes, since share generation occurs only once per new user.
Undoubtedly, the processing time of almost 30 seconds that the Eµ.Setup operation has
when 1λ = 2048 would not be acceptable if the operation was to occur frequently during
scheme operation. Thankfully, the Eµ.Setup operation is performed by the IdP only once,
at the moment of the initial system deployment, and is therefore not significant for regular
scheme runtime.
File Upload and Download
We analyze the upload operation first. We split the cost of the operation into smaller
isolated components that we analyze separately, and then compose into the total operation
cost.
Upload(F,Ui) (see Figure 5.4) of an unpopular file can be decomposed into the following
operations:
UP1 Convergent encryption and tag generation
UP2 Decryption share generation
UP3 Secure index obtaining
UP4 Symmetric encryption of the convergent ciphertext
UP5 Threshold encryption of the symmetric key
UP6 Data transfer
For a popular file upload, UP4 and UP5 are missing and UP6 transfers only an
index instead of file contents. UP1 is common for all deduplication schemes exploiting
convergent encryption and its cost is filesize dependent. UP2, UP3 and UP5 represent
the cost of operations present only in our scheme and are filesize independent. UP4
represents the cost of operation present only of our scheme and is filesize dependent. UP6
is both filesize and bandwidth dependent and is present in all deduplication schemes.
Table 7.7: Scheme Parameters Generation and Initialization (in seconds)
λ Parameter Generation Scheme Initialization
512 0.45 0.023
1024 4.25 0.023
2048 28.40 0.023
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To evaluate the cost of operations independently of the filesize, we used a 1 KB file
and repeated the upload process 100 times (without UP6). Table 7.8 lists the results.
Since the value of UP3 highly depends on the distance and link quality between IRS
and the user (the computation takes 4 ms only), we present three values – the first value
corresponds to IRS and user in the same country (CZ), direct distance appx. 200 km,
the second corresponds to the same continent (CZ-IT), appx. 1 000 km, and the third
to different continents (CZ-JPN), appx. 9 100 km. Note that UP3 can be split further
into subcomponents UP3.1 secure channel establishment, UP3.2 over-the channel data
transmission and UP3.3 secure index generation. To minimize cost, we recommended to
do UP3.1 only once for batch uploads and re-use the established secure channel.
To evaluate the cost of operations UP1 and UP4 (dependent on the filesize) we split
the operations further into subcomponents. UP1(|F |) = {SHA256(|F |)+AES128.E(|F |)+
SHA256(|F |)} and UP4(|F |) = {AES128.K+AES128.E(F )} (AES128.K is just a random
number generation). Since both hashing and symmetric encryption should scale almost
linearly with the filesize we have used two test files of size 1 MB and 64 MB and repeated
the upload procedure for each of them 100 times (without UP6) to compute the average
throughput. The resulting approximate throughput for UP1 is 100 MBps and for UP4
500 MBps.
Since UP6 represents the actual data upload, we can perceive UP1 to UP5 as an
unpopular file upload overhead incurred by our scheme compared to a plaintext remote
storage scheme without any deduplication and encryption. The overhead is composed of
constant cost Tconst = T (UP2) +T (UP3) +T (UP5) and filesize-dependent relative cost
of Trel(|F |) = T (UP1(|F |)) + T (UP4(|F |)). From the measurements, it is clear that the
constant cost would be the major overhead for small files and with the increasing filesize,
the relative cost would become predominant. To obtain concrete numbers we adopted
the approach suggested by Bellare et al. [5] and generated a set of random content files
of size 22i kB for i ∈ {0, 1, .., 8} (i.e. from 1 kB to 64 MB) and uploaded them using
only the Dropbox API (i.e. plain non-encrypted upload, only UP6) and then using our
scheme (i.e. using UP1 to UP6 for unpopular file and UP1 to UP3 + UP6 [index
Mean Standard Deviation
T (UP2) 5.14 0.01
T (UP3) 26.3; 112.5; 1 090 0.93; 2.18; 17.45
T (UP5) 36.48 2.55
Table 7.8: Cost of operations independent of the filesize (in milliseconds). The three
T (UP3) values correspond to different geographical settings (same country; same conti-
nent; different continents).
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Figure 7.4: Upload duration comparison for plain Dropbox and Dropbox with our scheme.
only] for popular file; using T (UP3) = 112.5 ms). We repeated the experiment 10x to
avoid single-measurement errors, the results are available in Figure 7.4.
While Figure 7.4 demonstrates that the overhead incurred by our scheme for unpopular
file upload is minimal (especially for bigger files), it is caused mainly by the very low upload
speed to the Dropbox storage. If the upload speed was higher then the cost would be
proportionally bigger since the time to upload the actual data would shorten. Due to the
constant cost Tconst it is not possible to compute throughput of our scheme, but we can
compute relative throughput per filesize considering sequential upload of uniform-sized
files like THR(|F |) = (1/(Tconst + Trel(|F |))). Using concrete values, the THR(1kB) =
6.45kBps, THR(1MB) = 6MBps and THR(64MB) = 69.4MBps. To conclude, if the user
would upload files of average size 1 MB he would not perceive any notable delay if the
upload speed to the storage provider would be lower or equal to 6 MBps (respectively 48
Mbps). Note that the computation does not include the per-file storage provider upload
initialization cost so the actual real speeds would be even higher.
The cost of the Download(F,Ui) operation is very easy to analyse since it corresponds
either to 1x AES128.D(|F |) for popular file or 2x AES128.D(|F |) for unpopular file plus
the actual data transfer from the storage to the user. Since throughput of AES128.D on
our testing machine is over 1 GBps (thanks to parallelization of the decryption process)
it is unlikely that the cost would be noticeable compared to the actual data transfer.
Deduplication
The Deduplicate(indexes, shares) algorithm can be decomposed into the following opera-
tions:
DE1 IRS sends a set of indexes and decryption shares to S
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DE2 S threshold-decrypting symmetric key(s)
DE3 S symmetrically-decrypting unpopular file(s)
DE4 S discards unpopular files and stores one popular file
Since DE1 is transfer of filesize-independent sets of indexes and shares, it is of near-
constant cost and, assuming reasonably good connection of 1 MBps, t = 1 000 and ping
RTT from S to IRS as 200ms, the T (DE1) = 600 ms. DE2 is filesize-independent and
has a measured constant cost T (DE2) = 266.3 ms (standard deviation 1.42). DE3 is
filesize dependent and corresponds to AES128.D which reaches 1 GBps throughput in our
test setting. DE4 is the cost incurred by S implementation.
While the cost of deduplication is substantial, it occurs only once per file transiting
states and the computationally-intensive part can be scheduled by the storage provider
upon need. A greater limitation is the need to implement the functionality itself in the
storage provider S. While the implementation is straightforward and should not be diffi-
cult to be performed by S “inside”, it is almost impossible to achieve it by modifications
done “from the outside”.
7.4.4 Performance Comparison of Different Solutions
Since scheme initialization and user registration procedures are varied among the different
solutions and are relatively rare (compared to file manipulation operations), we leave them
out of the comparison. For completeness we stress that in neither of the tested prototypes
these procedures took longer than a few seconds. Instead, we focus mostly on the Put
(respectively Upload) operation for deduplicable files (since that is the most important
from the practical usage perspective) and compare the costs for the different prototypes
and a plain Dropbox service (without deduplication). Afterwards we briefly analyze the
Get operation, communication cost and analysis of its specific deduplication operation
cost.
Deduplicable Put request: To compare the prototypes practically we use the UPC
dataset from Section 7.2. To avoid the initialization period with an empty storage and
no deduplication, we model a situation where every file F from the dataset was already
uploaded approx. pF/2 times. Next, we randomly sample 100 files from the dataset,
generate 100 Put requests for these files per each prototype and measure processing time
using the Python time (respectively JS Date) module. The aggregate results plotted in
Figure 7.5 demonstrate that solutions not interacting with Dropbox for a deduplicated
file upload (ClearBox and Liu et al.) have much better results. The outliers suggest a
few Put requests taking significantly longer than the others. Interestingly, even though
CHAPTER 7. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 73
Figure 7.5: Average processing time of a Put request for a deduplicable file from a ran-
domly chosen 100-file sample from the UPC dataset.
our scheme uses Dropbox only to store a short hash per file, interaction with Dropbox
takes similar time as the plain Dropbox solution that always stores the entire file. This
suggests that for most files in the sample, connection initiation and request set-up with
Dropbox take significantly more time than the actual file transfer.
To provide a more detailed analysis, we have chosen two Put requests – one with the
lowest processing time and one with the highest processing time (across all prototypes) and
split the processing times into client computation, server computation, communication
between client(s) and server and interaction between client/server and Dropbox, as shown
in Figure 7.6.
To demonstrate that file size is likely the major influence factor we use a dataset of
random content files of size 22i KB for i ∈ {0, 1, .., 8} (i.e. from 1 KB to 64 MB), pre-
upload them enough times to make them popular and then measure Put requests for each,
see Figure 7.7. The results demonstrate that ClearBox is the best for deduplicable small
files, but for larger files the client-side processing is increasing notably (mostly due to the
complex FID computation). The prototype by Liu et al. shows very smooth results, only
lightly dependent on the file size (initial file hashing) but has the biggest communication
cost. Our scheme and DupLESS are highly influenced by interaction with Dropbox and
would benefit from a cloud backend with much faster connection initiation. Interestingly,
Dropbox is obviously slower during the initial upload request (first file for our scheme and
DupLESS) than during the following ones.
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Figure 7.6: Put request with the lowest (left; 157 KB file) and the highest (right, 33 MB
file) processing time split into individual costs (same sample as Figure 7.5).
Communication cost: We use tcpdump to measure communication on the network
interface for a deduplicable 1MB file (cost is file-size-independent, provided that PoW in
ClearBox is capped for 64 MB buffer as suggested). We repeated the Put operation 100x
to avoid single-measurement errors. Both in our scheme and in DupLESS the client only
sends one request and receives one reply, together these correspond to less than 1 KB
(including the DupLESS-based session tracking and rate limiting information). ClearBox
uses three requests and responses per Put (key request, FID and PoW challenge). The
cost depends on the PoW parameters, for the tested settings it did not reach 10 KB. The
proposal of Liu et al. contains significant cost due to the PAKE processing (set to default
30 requests) and averaged at 110 KB per Put.
Non-deduplicable Put request: All prototypes inherit the Dropbox interaction
cost of DupLESS (see Figure 7.7, DupLESS, yellow bar) corresponding to the actual data
upload, ClearBox adds intensive PoW computation on the server-side, the proposal of
Liu et al. spares some PAKE communication and our scheme adds additional encryption
layer (which is quite fast and corresponds only to about 1/3 more client computation
cost). DupLESS retains the cost as it does not differ between Put for deduplicable and
non-deduplicable file. Even though ClearBox has the highest cost, it happens only once
per file (first upload), but potentially more times for Liu et al. and t times for our scheme.
Whichever scheme is used, the initial deployment cost will be considerably higher than
the processing cost once the storage “fills in” reasonably.
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Figure 7.7: Processing time of Put requests for deduplicable files of size 22i KB for i ∈
{0, 1, .., 8} (plotted left to right per prototype).
Get request: The comparison of Get requests processing reveals that all schemes
perform near-equally. ClearBox adds computational cost by generating the download
URL, the proposal by Liu et al. was originally designed to use storage directly on server
so the data flows through it from Dropbox to client. Our scheme and DupLESS allow the
clients to connect directly to Dropbox and get their files; our scheme requires an additional
decrypt in case of an unpopular file. All the added costs are marginal compared to the
cost of Dropbox interaction and the actual data download.
Deduplication: The actual deduplication process is nearly “free” (comparison of
hashes or encrypted data) for all prototypes but that of our scheme. In our scheme,
deduplication must be implemented in the cloud backend and consumes approx. 850ms
(considering 1MBps link between IRS and S) + symmetric decryption of the upper en-
cryption layer for at least one file (more if checks are required). This cost, while higher
than for other schemes, is still under 1s for a 100MB file. This measurement was done on
a separate cloud application as Dropbox does not support it.
7.5 Summary
Chapter 7 presented a metric to measure the space reduction efficiency of our scheme
– the Space Reduction Ratio (SRR), and covered an analysis of the computation and
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communication cost of our scheme and of representative examples of other secure data
deduplication schemes.
With respect to the space reduction efficiency, ClearBox and DupLESS implement a
perfect deduplication scheme and thus achieve the highest possible SRR for any dataset.
Our scheme and the scheme proposed by Liu et al. have varying efficiency, based on the
parameters of the scheme and properties of the dataset. Plain Dropbox was used only for
comparison and does not offer any deduplication, thus no space reduction.
Considering the computation and communication cost, all analyzed schemes have very
low server computation cost, allowing the server components to serve multiple clients and
scale well when needed. Comparison with a plain Dropbox service shows that deployment
of the analysed schemes lowers the user-perceived latency for popular file Put requests
(with the exception of DupLESS which only increases the latency by less than 1/10 per
Put) and adds only a minimal overhead cost for Get requests. Considering the offered
storage space reduction, all solutions create a win-win situation for both users and storage
providers.
The results of the comparative analysis of performance of the different schemes from
the computation and communication cost point of view demonstrate that there is no
“winner” in this respect, each analyzed scheme has its pros and cons. Using the results of
Put measurements, we demonstrate that, depending on the cloud back-end performance,
our scheme is on par with ClearBox for smaller files and outperforms it for bigger files,
the scheme of Liu et al. outperforms other schemes for bigger files but is ineffective for
small files. However, the increased cost of ClearBox for bigger files is largely caused by
the included Proof of Ownership mechanism that is not integrated in the other schemes
and the ineffectiveness of the scheme by Liu et al. for small files is caused by the need
to process the request also by other client(s) than only the uploading one, which, on the
other hand, enabled the scheme to limit the amount of potentially exploitable information
stored in the server application. Considering the ease of deployment, apart from ClearBox,
all schemes require modification of the cloud back-end. This is cumbersome, but viewed
from a different perspective, it enables the possibility to download files even if the server
component of these schemes is down (which is impossible in the case of ClearBox).
Despite the fact that all the analysed schemes offer secure data deduplication, they are
very different in many aspects. We recommend potential adopters to evaluate their needs
and choose the scheme that best fits their requirements and environment from functional,
security and performance perspectives. In Table 7.9 we list a few of the differentiating
features we identified, that might help in the decision process. We stress that each feature
can be considered as an advantage from one perspective and as a disadvantage from
another perspective and the schemes could be modified to support some of the features
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they do not include in their original design. The table should therefore serve more as a
basic view of what features each scheme offers out of the box as it was originally published
and designed.
Table 7.9: Feature comparison of different deduplication schemes; x - feature present; o -
feature not present; x∗ - not measured in our performance analysis, based on information
from the source paper
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Perfect deduplication x o o x x
No Indexing Server-like component o x o o o
No active participation of users on deduplication x o x x x
Transparent deduplication pattern attestation x o o o o
Automatic differentiation of popular and unpopular files o o x o o
Inherent resilience to storage-service-based side-channel attacks o o x o x
Limited file-size influence on deduplicable Put cost o x x o x∗
Incorporated Proof of Ownership mechanism x o o o o
Chapter 8
Conclusion
This thesis deals with the inherent tension between well established storage optimization
methods and end-to-end encryption in a practical example of a cloud storage service sce-
nario. Concretely, we focus on the issue of secure data deduplication, analyzing different
views of security versus deduplication. Based on the analysis we build a secure dedupli-
cation scheme implementing the idea of popularity where different data require different
protection based on how much they are shared (i.e. popular) among users. We present a
construction of our scheme, evaluate it from both security and performance views, discuss
it’s limitations and possible ideas for their alleviation and compare our scheme with other
state of the art secure data deduplication schemes.
Differently from the approach of related works that assume all files to be equally
security-sensitive, we vary the security level of a file based on how popular that file
is among the users of the system. This is a major switch in view of file security – the
traditional view that takes file contents as the major factor when considering file sensitivity
and potential level of protection of the file is replaced by a view that instead of contents
considers file popularity and argues that once a file is “widely known”, there is no point
in keeping it “heavily protected”. This novel view may be of independent interest.
Our proposed secure data deduplication scheme has two major advantages (provided
the popularity-based classification is acceptable for the scheme users) – the users no
longer need to manually classify sensitive files (since all files are first unpopular and
thus protected using a semantically secure cryptosystem), and the transition between
unpopular and popular state is automatic and does not require active user participation.
The advantages come at the cost of disadvantages – our scheme has lower deduplication
ratio than perfect deduplication schemes and the computation cost of scheme operations
is not negligible.
To ease possible adoption of a secure deduplication scheme by cloud storage service
providers we provide an extensive performance and security evaluation of our scheme and
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compare it with other state of the art schemes. Our evaluation shows that there is no
clear “winner” (i.e. the best secure deduplication scheme) among the proposals – each
scheme has some pros and cons. Performance-wise, none of the evaluated schemes outper-
forms others under all conditions, each has advantages and disadvantages with regards
to a particular data mix, environment and requirements. Security-wise, our scheme is
resilient to user-collusion attacks (up to a clearly defined point) and to an honest but
curious storage provider. By automatically differentiating between popular and unpopu-
lar data, our scheme alleviates the user’s need to handle low-entropy files differently (if
their eventual deduplication is acceptable) and surpasses the other schemes in the fact
that it never deduplicates unpopular files nor leaks whether there are any duplicates of
unpopular files in the storage (unless the indexing server is compromised).
Admittedly, secure data deduplication schemes (ours included) are not perfect and
their concrete performance highly depends on the underlying dataset. However, the
steeply increasing amount of data being stored in cloud storage services calls for us-
age of storage optimization methods and deduplication seems a viable candidate. This
thesis can help the readers to understand the risks related to data deduplication and make
decisions regarding potential secure data deduplication scheme adoption based on their
concrete requirements and setup.
Despite existence of multitude of secure data deduplication scheme proposals, all of
them use the deduplication index. The deduplication index is, by its nature, a leakage
of information about file contents. However, without the deduplication index, it is not
possible to find out that two files are the same (and thus can be deduplicated). All the
schemes analysed in this work, including ours, solve this index-caused security weakness
by handling it by a trusted component or requiring active participation of users storing
the respective indexes locally. Finding a solution that would not use the deduplication
index but rather some other innovative approach, without the inherent security weakness
introduced by the deduplication index, is still an open problem.
Appendix A
PhD Studies – Overview and Results
Due to quite changing topics of interest during my PhD studies there is a lot of research
that is not included in this thesis but was part of my PhD studies. For completeness I
present a short time-ordered summary of my PhD studies and the respective publication
results.
I started my PhD studies in 2011 with the original topic of SIP (Session Initiation
Protocol), respectively VoIP (Voice over IP) security. The initial research showed that
SIP servers (core building blocks of SIP infrastructure) are very prone to Denial of Service
(DoS) attacks and there is no suitable protection available. To attract attention to the
issue we first published (together with my supervisor) a paper describing the issue [42],
including a simple SIP DoS attack tool as a proof of concept that the threat is real.
Afterwards I designed and evaluated a few possible approaches how to defend against
such attacks. The result of this research was another publication describing design of
a DDoS protection solution tailored specifically for SIP servers [43]. During the SIP-
oriented research, I found myself constantly lacking sources of real or at least real-like
traffic. Therefore we decided to collaborate with a testing-oriented free SIP network
iptel.org, represented by Jiri Kuthan, and prepared an analysis of real SIP traffic [44].
As the next step, we implemented a tool to anonymize SIP traffic such that it can be
shared with public without risking potential disclosure of client/confidential data, and a
portal where such anonymized traffic can be shared. To prove that anonymization does
not remove interesting factors from the data we published an analysis of anonymized data
yielding useful results [45]. When preparing the infrastructure and doing processing of
the collected data, I became more familiar with cloud technologies and noted a new vast
field of potentially very interesting security problems. After playing with the provided
cloud solutions a bit, we decided with my supervisor that it might be worth switching
topics to cloud security as this field was rapidly expanding and offering quite a few novel
security challenges.
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In the beginning of my “cloud security” PhD era I did an exploratory work to see
what was already done, what is available and what is a likely candidate to pursuit. This
preliminary work resulted in a short review summarizing fully homomorphic encryption
(FHE) and multiple sources regarding the current state of the art research in the cloud
security research area. Despite being very interesting, the FHE topic was already being
researched by multiple teams around the world and the amount of “familiarization work”
required to become an active part of this research was too high to be feasible for me
at that, already advanced, stage of PhD studies. Not to waste the concise FHE survey
that resulted from the exploratory work, I discussed with my colleagues at the university
and we decided that it might be useful to attract students to the topic. Thus I have
re-formed, simplified and translated the survey to Czech language and provided it is a
study material for students of the “Introduction to Information Security” course. Next
to the FHE topic, I also ended up with many other viable research options. We discussed
them with my supervisor and formulated a few most promising topics to be pursued in
further research. To evaluate the “attractiveness” of the topics to the research community
I joined an open call offering student internships at IBM Research – Zurich and discussed
the topics with their research team during the applicant interviews. As a result I was
accepted for the internship with the topic focusing on secure deduplication. I started my
6-months internship and secure deduplication-oriented research in mid-2012 and continued
till 2016, having a chance to do another 6-months internship at IBM Research – Zurich in
2014. The results of this research are described in this thesis and were also published in
form of one patent [46], one conference publication [47] and one journal publication [48].
As part of the work at the internships I also participated in the backup and storage
research area and, together with my IBM colleagues, we formulated a mechanism how to
efficiently implement secure deduplication also for tape-based storages. This work also
resulted in patent application [49]. Despite being very-well perceived by the research
community, secure deduplication did not get much practical applications yet, since the
solutions providing reasonable security levels are also more resource-requiring. At the time
of the research, companies either didn’t move to public cloud at all, preferring isolated
private clouds, or used legal-based forms of security (Service Level Agreements with legally
binding clauses) rather than technical security solutions. A few big companies created
dominant cloud platforms that “are supposedly secure”, though noone really explained
how exactly this security is assured and didn’t formalize (or disclose) the threat models
and actors. This attitude is slowly changing now and secure deduplication is, among
other cloud-security related technical solutions, very likely to become also practically
adopted (or at least it seems from the growing number of patents being issued in the
field). However, in 2016 it seemed the practical adoption will take a few years and after
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a more theoretical research I was striving for some hands-on security that will likely be
practically adopted quickly. A chance came in form of the emerging Internet of Things
(IoT) – hitting the market very fast means very likely very poor security which inherently
means a lot of potential for applied security research.
My research towards IoT security started as a joint work between university and a
private company that started to replace their traditional production with smart (i.e.
connected) devices. The first results of research were documents evaluating security of
design of an Over the Air Update solution proposed for the new smart devices and security
evaluation of a prototype smart device. Unfortunately, due to the confidential nature of
the results (since security flaws, planned patches and new, more-secure, system designs
must not be published to keep the company secure and business-like ahead of competitors)
publication of these results is currently not possible. Also, a lot of the results of this work
are concerning applied security, which is very interesting for in-field deployment, but not
as much interesting to the research community. Evaluating my current research results, we
concluded with my supervisor that the most impactful research that is already published
is the work that focuses on the secure deduplication and so I decided to finish my PhD
studies (i.e. write this thesis) focusing on this topic. It is very likely that in the future,
the situation will change and IoT secure system designs will be widely published whereas
the for-now mostly-theoretical field of secure deduplication will become more applied. But
waiting for that time might well prove to be too long and since some new topic might
gain my interest in the meantime, it seems a much better idea to finish PhD now, not to
be doing it “virtually forever” [smileys are not to be included in a serious research work].
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List of Publications
This list covers all publications, that I authored or co-authored during my PhD studies.
Publications are sorted according to their citation count reported by Google Scholar (GS)
and Web of Science (WoS). Data snapshot taken in February 2018.
Publication Citations
GS (WoS)
J. Stanek, A. Sorniotti, E. Androulaki, and L. Kencl, “A secure data dedu-
plication scheme for cloud storage”, in International Conference on Finan-
cial Cryptography and Data Security, 2014
161 (30)
J. Stanek and L. Kencl, “SIPp-DD: SIP DDoS flood-attack simulation tool”,
in Proceedings of 20th International Conference on Computer Communica-
tions and Networks (ICCCN), 2011
16 (4)
J. Stanek, L. Kencl, and J. Kuthan, “Characteristics of real open SIP-
server traffic”, in International Conference on Passive and Active Network
Measurement, 2013
7
J. Stanek and L. Kencl, “SIP protector: Defense architecture mitigating
DDoS flood attacks against SIP servers”, in IEEE International Conference
on Communications (ICC), 2012
5 (1)
J. Stanek and L. Kencl, “Enhanced secure thresholded data deduplication
scheme for cloud storage”, IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure
Computing, vol. PP, no. 99, 2016
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J. Stanek, L. Kencl, and J. Kuthan, “Analyzing anomalies in anonymized
SIP traffic”, in IFIP Networking Conference, 2014
3
R. Cideciyan, J. Jelitto, S. Sarafijanovic, and J. Stanek, US patent
application 20140358871, 2014. [Online]. Available: http : / / www .
freepatentsonline.com/y2014/0358871.html
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PATENT 9292532: Remote data storage, 2016. [Online]. Available: http:
//www.freepatentsonline.com/9292532.html
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University Requirements
This list covers all publications, that I authored or co-authored during my PhD studies.
Publications are sorted according to the university requirements. Where author partici-
pation is not specifically noted then participation of all co-authors of the work was equal.
C.1 Publications Related to Thesis Topic
Publication Type
Author participation (if not equal)
J. Stanek, A. Sorniotti, E. Androulaki, and L. Kencl, “A secure data
deduplication scheme for cloud storage”, in International Confer-
ence on Financial Cryptography and Data Security, 2014
Indexed by ISI*
Stanek 40%, Kencl 15%, Androulaki 20%, Sorniotti 25%
J. Stanek and L. Kencl, “Enhanced secure thresholded data dedu-
plication scheme for cloud storage”, IEEE Transactions on Depend-
able and Secure Computing, vol. PP, no. 99, 2016
Journal with Im-
pact Factor
R. Cideciyan, J. Jelitto, S. Sarafijanovic, and J. Stanek, US patent
application 20140358871, 2014. [Online]. Available: http://www.
freepatentsonline.com/y2014/0358871.html
Patent applica-
tion
J. Jelitto, T. Mittelholzer, S. Sarafijanovic, A. Sorniotti, and J.
Stanek, US PATENT 9292532: Remote data storage, 2016. [On-
line]. Available: http://www.freepatentsonline.com/9292532.
html
Patent
* ISI - Institute for Scientific Information
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C.2 Other Publications
Publication Type
Author participation (if not equal)
J. Stanek and L. Kencl, “SIPp-DD: SIP DDoS flood-attack sim-
ulation tool”, in Proceedings of 20th International Conference on
Computer Communications and Networks (ICCCN), 2011
Indexed by ISI*
Stanek 60%, Kencl 40%
J. Stanek and L. Kencl, “SIP protector: Defense architecture miti-
gating DDoS flood attacks against SIP servers”, in IEEE Interna-
tional Conference on Communications (ICC), 2012
Indexed by ISI*
Stanek 60%, Kencl 40%
J. Stanek, L. Kencl, and J. Kuthan, “Characteristics of real open
SIP-server traffic”, in International Conference on Passive and Ac-
tive Network Measurement, 2013
Other publica-
tion
Stanek 50%, Kencl 25%, Kuthan 25%
J. Stanek, L. Kencl, and J. Kuthan, “Analyzing anomalies in
anonymized SIP traffic”, in IFIP Networking Conference, 2014
Indexed by ISI*
Stanek 50%, Kencl 40%, Kuthan 10%
* ISI - Institute for Scientific Information
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